Implements docs/deprovision-os-account.md. Until now deleteUserHandler removed the row, cascaded the
database, and left the entire Linux side running — measured on production on 2026-08-12: working login
shell, healthy postgres container, 454M of data, uid queued for the next useradd to reissue along with
everything still owned by it.
The load-bearing rule from the spec: sever the data from the uid BEFORE releasing the uid, and if
severing fails, do not release. A failed deprovision is not a broken account, it is a trap for whoever
is created next.
Sequence: disable-linger, terminate-user, reap-and-prove, chown -R, userdel (never -r).
reap terminate-user is not a barrier. Production measured a three-hour-old `/bin/zsh -i` surviving
it AND the removal of /run/user/<uid>. So: pkill, bounded wait, pkill -9, bounded wait, and a
final count that must be zero or the account is not released.
chown fixes the uid and subuid halves in one pass — it rewrites every file it walks whatever owned
it. The range is still captured first, because userdel removes the /etc/subuid entry and after
that nothing on the machine remembers what it was. It is returned on every path including the
failures, and logged as the exact assert-uid-free.sh command line.
Two guards the spec did not ask for, both pure and unit-tested:
guardDeletable ensureOsUser's adoption rule backwards. Deletable only if the passwd home is the one
the platform would have confined, and uid >= 1000. Without it `userdel root` is one
bad users.osUser away and nothing else in the sequence would object.
guardMemberTree the tree must resolve to a direct child of DATA_PATH. The email reaches join() from a
database row and the result is the argument to a recursive chown.
chown runs with -h. Measured here that `chown -R` already declines to follow a symlink out of the tree and
re-owns the link itself, but the argv should say so rather than rest on traversal semantics — and
re-owning links is what makes `find -uid` (lstat) a meaningful check afterwards.
destroy exists, has no call site, and is chown-then-delete-as-the-service-user rather than sudo rm -rf, so
a recursive root delete built from a database column does not exist in this codebase.
deleteUserHandler now runs this FIRST and refuses to delete the row if it fails: the row is what remembers
there is anything to clean up, so deleting it first makes a failure unrecoverable through the UI.
NOT YET RUN AGAINST A REAL ACCOUNT. Only the pure guards have tests. The five-step validation is in the
doc; it needs the production host, a shell left open, and a container writing as a non-root user — the two
cases the quiet path passes vacuously.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two of the eight did not belong. cleanup-desktop.sh is the teardown — the inverse of an install, not part
of one. provision-user-dirs.ts runs per account at invite time, on a machine that is already set up.
Both are back at the top level, with their `../` derivations and usage strings put back.
What is left is what a fresh machine runs once: the two installers (setup.sh, setup_mac_light.sh), the
two things setup.sh calls (setup-dockers.sh, setup-desktop.sh), and the two files they deploy —
starship.toml, copied to ~/.config, and officer-set-display.sh, which setup-desktop.sh installs to
~/.local/bin as a login-time mode setter. The last one is not a setup script and does not read like one;
it is here because it is install payload, same as the toml, and setup-desktop.sh loads it by
`$(dirname $0)`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/ was holding two unrelated kinds of thing: install-this-machine, and run-this-occasionally. The
eight installers now live in scripts/setup/; what stays at the top level is the build steps (gen-index,
prebuild, build/) and the two maintenance scripts (reindex-music, rebuild-soulseek-tree).
The move is not just a rename. Three of these derive the repo root from their own location:
setup.sh:51 PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
setup_mac_light.sh:51 same
cleanup-desktop.sh:134 ENV_FILE="$(dirname "$0")/../.env"
Left alone, all three would now resolve to scripts/ — and nothing downstream complains. PROJECT_DIR is
where .env is written, where `bun install`, `gen:index` and `db:push` run, and what pm2 is pointed at, so
a fresh install would have quietly provisioned scripts/ and reported success. cleanup-desktop.sh fails
the other way: it would find no .env, print "No .env — skipping", and leave the real VNC_PASSWORD in the
real file. All three are now `../..` with a comment saying why the level matters.
provision-user-dirs.ts imports data-path.ts relatively; that one tsgo caught.
Also disambiguated `setup.sh` where it had become two files. app-store/templates/<name>/setup.sh is a
per-sidecar installer with its own contract, and preflight.ts + docs/sidecar-app-store.md discussed both
in the same paragraph. The host one is now spelled with its full path at those sites.
Verified: bash -n on all six shell scripts, tsgo clean, os-user tests pass, both derivations resolve to
the repo root, starship.toml still resolves from os-user-shell.ts, and provision-user-dirs.ts runs under
DRY_RUN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidecar-app-store channel ran one night, from per-user Linux accounts to a
member's first agent turn, and is deleted now the work has landed. A spent
channel left in place gets read as current, which is worse than none.
Three things lived only in those docs and move to TODO.md rather than
disappearing: deprovisionOsAccount (observed on production — a deleted member
kept a shell, a running container and 454M of data, with their uid free to
reissue), the terminal replaying query sequences as keystrokes, and agent
sessions not being durable, which is one missing property behind three symptoms.
The deprovision spec itself already lives in docs/.
CLAUDE.md's section is rewritten from "here is the current channel" to how to
run one, since the answer to "which channels exist" is now none. What is worth
keeping is the protocol that emerged: numbered alternating files, parity as the
author, a reply even when there is nothing to say, and termination on a
checkable condition rather than on someone deciding it feels finished.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/users plus an Add-account form in Settings > User management. Until now
createUser had one call site — bootstrap, gated on an empty user table — so every
non-owner account anywhere had been inserted into Postgres by hand.
Created accounts are Active. The column defaults to Unverified and signin refuses
anything else with a bare UNAUTHORIZED, which is exactly what made the hand-INSERT
route look like a wrong password.
Also closes a hole found while reading the write path: a second Super Admin was
storable. The CHECK constraint pins user 1's role but cannot see other rows, and
getOwnerUser() was LIMIT 1 with no ORDER BY, so two holders would have made "who owns
this server" a question the query plan answered — and that answer feeds the agent
sidecar's identity, vault access and origin scoping. Both write paths now refuse the
role and getOwnerUser() orders by id.
USER_DIRS and provisionUserDirs move into data-path.ts so the create handler and
scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts cannot disagree about what an account's skeleton is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLAUDE.md asserted "single-user is a hard invariant, not a stage" while
users held six rows and role_capabilities held grants. Every doc that
repeated it is corrected here, in prose and in the code comments that
carried the same claim.
The accurate statement is narrower: one owner who bypasses every check,
other accounts holding only what their role is granted, and a set of
capabilities — terminal, chat, files, tasks, items, desktop, browser — that
are structurally ungrantable because they execute as the owner's OS user.
TODO.md gains a Multi-user section for what the read turned up: no way to
create a second account, dashboards.id colliding across users, authorize.ts
untested, pty/vault/opencode taking no identity, Radicale still owner_only.
claude-sidecar-isolation.md's open question is answered rather than left
open — the per-email spawn model is dead weight, because chat is an
execution capability and no second account can ever reach it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the framework has no tests, no error boundaries and a handful of known
defects that keep resurfacing mid-feature. write them down once, ranked,
so they can be picked off in the context of whatever is being built.
notable: the dashboards PATCH dispatcher silently drops any key family it
has no branch for, and three in use today (tmux, nvim, claude-code, all
from Terminal's statePrefix) match nothing — so that state never persists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
policy: /_officer/policy GET/PUT. the text goes up byte for byte and
headscale's verdict comes back verbatim — it owns the only parser that
resolves groups, tags and hosts, so a second one here would disagree with
what actually enforces. a file-backed policy is still served over GET and
only refuses on PUT, so writability cannot be read: the first save finds
out, and a refusal becomes a persistent read-only banner rather than a
rejection the owner would go hunting for a syntax error over.
nodes: move between users, and a tag editor for the setTags route that had
no ui. both sit together in the expanded card because both decide which
policy rules apply to a node, and a move says so before it happens.
Found while reading the app, not while fixing anything. The policy editor is the
only one that costs an ssh session today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the TODO item about orphaned/duplicated VNC servers across sidecar restarts. The diagnosis
there was correct and outlived the move off x11vnc, because the shape of the bug is in the lifecycle,
not the server: the running desktop lives in module state, a sidecar restart forgets it while the
process keeps running, and waitForPort accepted ANY listener on 5900 as proof of a healthy start.
The next start would then spawn a server that could not bind the port, see the ORPHAN listening, and
report success — leaving the platform convinced it had started a desktop the browser was not
looking at.
Two changes. reclaimPort frees the port before spawning: TERM whatever holds it, KILL after two
seconds. waitForPort now also fails when the process we spawned has exited, so a foreign listener
cannot be mistaken for our own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First pass of the documentation audit. Every doc was read against what the code actually
does now; this commit fixes the ones worth keeping and deletes the ones that were only
describing a past.
Corrected:
- CLAUDE.md — said seven WebSocket providers (there are eight, and terminal/vault are byte
relays now, not translating bridges), listed channels/ as "Telegram / WhatsApp / Discord
bridges" (they are gone; what remains is how /chat drives an agent turn), missed
officer-wallet in the PM2 list and notify/ in the layout, and described the per-account
email SQLite stores without saying they are the sidecar's and that nothing in the platform
opens them. Further Reading pointed at four files that no longer exist and missed the four
newest.
- docs/working-on-officer.md — PM2 list was four sidecars short, and it still explained the
officer-claude rename as news. Replaced with the thing a reader actually needs: which
process to restart for which change, and why restarting officer no longer costs you a
terminal or an agent session.
- TODO.md — the "dead username plumbing" item was mostly resolved by deleting the channels,
and two email items pointed at api/email/email-db.ts, which is sidecar/email/store.ts now.
- AGENTS.md — trailing paragraph listed the design notes being deleted here.
- MUSIC_API.md — playlists were entirely undocumented: seven endpoints the phone app has no
reference for. Added from the sidecar's own contract.
- docs/jobs-unification.md — phases 1-3 shipped, so it now says so at the top. Phase 4 (push
notifications) is the only reason the file still exists, and email sync is explicitly no
longer part of it.
Deleted, all superseded rather than merely old:
- PHONE_APP.md — a February plan for apps that now exist, with their own repo and README.
- MARKETING_WEBSITE.md — a plan for a site this repo does not contain.
- SECURITY_AUDIT.md + SECURITY_FIXES.md — a February audit of a codebase since restructured;
it still cites queue/handlers, which is now empty.
- docs/DOCKERIZATION_PLAN.md — cites pty-sidecar, whatsapp and projects, all deleted.
- SETUP_GUIDE.md — documents systemd units and setup scripts replaced by PM2 and `bun setup`.
Not harmless: /etc/systemd/system/officer-pty-sidecar.service is still enabled on this host,
pointing at a `monorepo/` directory that no longer exists, and has been failing to start
ever since. That guide is how it got there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-transmission is a new pm2 peer that owns the transmission rpc
connection and exposes a curated /_officer/* contract instead of proxying
raw rpc. it absorbs the three quirks callers otherwise have to know about:
the 409 x-transmission-session-id handshake, failures returned as
{"result": "..."} inside http 200, and basic auth where an empty username
must send no header at all.
/transmission is the ui, on the workspace/panel framework: a filter nav and
three sections (torrents, stats, settings). the torrent list is virtualised
with 30 available columns, multi-select, and a right-click menu; the detail
pane covers general, files as a real tree, peers and trackers. filters and
the open torrent live in the url, so a filtered view is a link.
phase 1 goal was parity with _references/transmission-web. follow-up work is
recorded in TODO.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the multi-user provisioning leftovers (the provision-existing-users.sh
migration was already deleted in the prior commit):
- gut provisionVncEnv from provision.ts (per-user startxfce4 virtual desktop, dead
since the switch to mirroring :0 — vnc-manager.ts self-provisions its own passwd)
- drop the Pi `.pi/agent/sessions` seed and the now-orphaned `run` helper
Wire provisioning into bootstrapHandler: the super admin (first user) is created via
createUser, which never called provisionUserEnvironment — only the invite/verify flow
did. So the single user's DATA_PATH/<email> was never provisioned up front. Now it is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the file browser sends msg.cwd relative to the user's home and it went straight to
Bun.spawn, which resolves it against the server's cwd. when that directory does not
exist posix_spawn reports ENOENT naming the binary rather than the directory, so
"Convert Audio" failed with the misleading "posix_spawn 'bash'".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the hand-installed systemd unit kept a parallel xfce session on :1 alive and
respawned it on every kill, independently of the platform. obsolete now that the
desktop panel mirrors :0; disabled, but the unit file is still on disk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- the sandbox already drops privileges to the OS user (id -un), so pi-bridge was
the only code path that switched to a per-user unix account
- the four accounts it targeted (andrepadez, john-wick, fedra, miguelbenoliel)
are vestigial: created by scripts/provision-existing-users.sh, with no home
dirs, no files, no processes. the only live account is pastilhas@officer.dev,
which maps to the service user, so isServiceUser was always true and the
sudo -u branch could never fire
- add TODO.md tracking the leftover username plumbing, the useradd script, known
bugs (task-executor relative cwd, bootstrap pi EEXIST), and the ufw 9010 rule
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5