2bb8128619ef672f6fa69b3ea0e749a6e7f04339
906
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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95951fbe5a |
resolve transcripts and cwd against the caller's home, not the owner's
The history layer, and the last change that could be made without a live member.
claude-sessions.ts had `claudeHome = process.env.HOME_DIR ?? join(DATA_PATH,
email, 'home')`, which discards its argument whenever HOME_DIR is set — always,
on a real install. Every transcript read therefore resolved to the OWNER'S
~/.claude no matter who asked, and the comment above it asserted "single-user
platform" as though that were a property rather than an assumption. A member
reaching these functions would have been handed the owner's conversation list.
Now every read takes a ChatIdentity {email, home} with the home resolved from
resolveHomeDir(userId), and this file has no way to invent one. Both fields
travel together because they are genuinely different: general_chat_sessions
lives under DATA_PATH/<email>, not under a home. Collapsing them would be the
same class of mistake as undefined meaning "the owner".
websocket.ts's resolveCwd takes a home, so `~` expands against the caller's own.
Identity is resolved BEFORE the cwd — expanding `~` before knowing whose home it
is would be exactly the bug being removed — which also let a duplicate
resolveTurnIdentity call from
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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6aeb304f56 |
never spell "I don't know whose turn this is" as "the owner"
host caught that resolveMemberRun failed open. Returning undefined means "run as the server owner" downstream — their binary, their ~/.claude credential, their HOME, their MCP config carrying OFFICER_AUTH_TOKEN — and three different inputs produced it: the caller being the owner, resolveHomeDir failing, and a member whose osUser is null. The last two mean "could not determine", and answering them with the owner's identity is the single thing this feature exists to prevent. 23's own comment said the caller must not fall back to the owner. The code did exactly that. The prose was right. Now a discriminated TurnIdentity: owner, member, or refuse-with-a-reason. The call site ends the turn on refuse instead of spawning. The owner's identity is reachable only by positively establishing isOwner, never by failing to establish anything else — resolveHomeDir already reported it as a positive fact and the funnel through undefined was the only thing discarding it. The null-osUser case is not hypothetical: provisionOsAccount is non-fatal at every stage and records the account either way, as its own source says. Tonight provisioning failed three separate ways on a real member and the account survived each time. No test yet, and the reason is in COMMS rather than hidden: it needs database fakes this repo has no pattern for, and inventing one at 01:00 to cover four branches is how the next defect gets written. The union is exhaustive, so tsgo catches a missing case — not the same thing, not nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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311b2ea55c |
populate member from the authenticated socket
The last mechanical link: chat socket -> resolveMemberRun(userId) -> ClaudeSpawnStreamingParams.member -> claude-manager's branch -> spawnClaudeAsMember -> sudo setpriv. The path from a request to a privilege drop is now complete. Resolved from the authenticated socket, never from the client message — the same rule server.tsx applies to the pty sidecar, where it deletes any client-supplied osUser/home from the query string before setting its own. resolveMemberRun returns undefined rather than throwing when a home cannot be resolved, because undefined means "the owner" downstream: an account with no Linux user has nothing to confine a turn to, and falling back to the owner is the one wrong answer that must not happen by accident. A separate function with that reasoning attached rather than an inline ternary. Still inert. Both gates refuse non-owners before this line is reached, so the only path that reaches it today returns undefined via isOwner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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8c4f150c15 |
stop one conversation's transport hiccup from killing every session
host found this while we were elsewhere: four agent-sidecar crashes tonight, one
truncating the owner's turn mid-sentence.
error: ProcessTransport is not ready for writing
at write (…/claude-agent-sdk/sdk.mjs) <- no frames from our code
A floating rejection inside the SDK's own input pump, so no await of ours could
have caught it. With no handler anywhere in src/servers it reached the top
level, Bun exited, PM2 restarted, and every live session on the machine died —
not just the one whose transport failed.
That is
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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d59adbf1f2 |
scope the six sessionKey commands to their caller
The control surface half of
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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9833822625 |
pass the member's gid instead of reusing their uid
host caught that provisionRootlessDocker had no gid field, so the new install -d passed uid in the group position. Correct on this host only because useradd allocates a per-user group; wrong on any account whose gid is not its uid — one created by hand, one on a host whose login.defs uses a shared group, or one ensureOsUser adopted rather than created. Mode 700 means the group triad grants nothing, so nothing breaks today. That is what makes it worth fixing now rather than later: it would surface only after somebody widened the mode for an unrelated reason, and then not obviously. The call site already held account.gid from ensureOsUser — the same value the .local fix used correctly earlier the same night. Threaded through rather than derived, and the field carries a comment saying why it is separate from uid, since they are equal here and a reader would ask. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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893130940e |
create docker's storage ourselves, so the strip is not a race
host verified green's reprovision: claude 2.1.228 installs and runs as the member, the file browser reads their home, rootless Docker runs and sees 0 containers while the owner has 8. First end-to-end proof of any of this. One thing came out dirty. ~/.local/share/docker carried the home's inherited default ACLs after a "successful" strip, because the strip was guarded on existsSync and only the daemon creates that directory. On a first run the guard was false and the strip no-opped; the retry then started the daemon, which created the directory and inherited the defaults. The run meant to clean it up was the one that made it, and the guard could not tell "nothing to strip" from "nothing there yet". Now created by us before the daemon exists — member-owned, 700, nothing to inherit — and the strip is unconditional afterwards, repairing an account provisioned before this and no-opping on a clean one. A guard that depends on another process having got there first is a race however it is written; the fix is owning the order rather than testing for it. Third bug of this class tonight: an implicit parent directory, a strip guarded on another process's work, and an installer piped into the wrong shell. All three were invisible until a real member account existed, which is the argument for making the second one sooner than feels necessary. Left alone deliberately: .local being unreadable by the platform (a decision about intent, not a defect, and the owner's), and the -u 70 + bind mount observation, whose probe host already distrusts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ef000aaf51 |
pipe the installer into bash, and stop inventing a root-owned .local
Green's first provision failed three ways. host caught all three on the live
box; two are fixed here and the third is his to bisect.
THE INSTALLER IS BASH AND WE PIPED IT INTO SH. A script read on stdin never has
its shebang honoured — the interpreter you name is the one that runs it — and
install.sh declares #!/bin/bash and uses [[ =~ ]] on line 9. On Ubuntu /bin/sh
is dash, so it died with `Syntax error: "(" unexpected`, which reads like a
corrupt download rather than the wrong interpreter. scripts/setup.sh carried the
same line for the owner's own install and is fixed too.
INSTALL -D CREATED ~/.local AS ROOT. `install -d` makes missing parents but
applies -o/-g/-m only to the final component, so blessing ~/.local/dockers
invented a root:root .local inside the member's own home. Rootless Docker then
died on `mkdir …/.local/share: permission denied`, and the Claude installer
targets ~/.local/bin, so fixing the shell alone would have hit this next.
That is
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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7cb402b25a |
chat sessions record whose they are, and refuse a mismatched caller
host found this reading 10: chat sessions carry no identity at all. state.ts
held a flat sessionKey -> transcript uuid map, the in-memory sessions Map was
keyed the same way, and websocket.ts takes sessionKey and resumeSessionId
straight off the client message.
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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3e0daee611 |
chmod the mcp config, because writeFileSync's mode never fires on it
host measured what
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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df4503180f |
stop handing a member's turn the owner's mcp config, and close the file
host found a live credential exposure while answering my question about what else the member branch missed. It was outside the diff, and predates all of it. MCP-CONFIG WAS NOT BRANCHED. mcpHostPath is module-level, written once at the owner's bootstrap, and was applied to every turn. Its env block carries OFFICER_AUTH_TOKEN, a 30-day JWT signing as the owner — so a member's turn would have spawned their MCP server holding it. Now inside the params.member ternary alongside the binary and the spawn, for the reason already written there: these values say whose turn this is and have to move together. A member gets none. What they should get instead is undecided, and undefined beats the owner's. THE FILE WAS 0644. Written with a bare writeFileSync into a 755 directory, on a host where `terminal` is granted to every role by default — so any member could cat it and hold owner-level API access on loopback. host verified that as a real member on the production host rather than reasoning about it. Now 0600. The mode is the only half of that which is code. The token has been world-readable and stays compromised until rotated, the directory chain above it is still 755, and neither is fixable from a commit. Both written up for the owner in COMMS 05, along with why I am stopping here rather than continuing: the next commit should be the rotation, not more feature work stacked on top of an open exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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fbabc22ed7 |
wire the member branch into the SDK spawn, still unreachable
ClaudeSpawnStreamingParams takes an optional member {osUser, home}; createSession
branches on it, using their binary and spawnClaudeAsMember together, or the
owner's CLAUDE_BIN as before.
THE BINARY AND THE PRIVILEGE DROP ARE ONE BRANCH ON PURPOSE. settingSources
makes ~/.claude authoritative for settings and ~ is whatever HOME the process
gets, so pointing the SDK at a member's binary while spawning as the service
user would read the OWNER'S settings and credential while running the member's
code — and it would look like it worked.
cwd defaults to member.home before HOST_HOME for the same reason: HOST_HOME is
this process's home, so a member would start in a directory they cannot read and
the failure would present as a broken agent rather than a wrong cwd.
Nothing populates `member`. Both gates refuse non-owners before any of this is
reached, so the delta is that spawnClaudeAsMember now has two importers instead
of one, and neither path a user can take changes. Verified rather than assumed,
since host made it a condition: both gates intact, 84 tests pass.
Not authorization: host gave an opinion on wire-first and deferred to the owner,
who has not ruled. Corrected in COMMS, where 01 had overstated it. The gates
come off on the owner's word alone; this reverts as one commit if the answer is
no.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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baa2d29fa4 |
read the probe off stdout by position, and renumber comms
host's finding on
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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288679af09 |
one sudo call for both agent-status answers, not two
host's finding on
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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6b7aad91db |
make both env guards able to fire, and follow the symlink
host was right twice, including about his own advice. Two dead guards had shipped here, both for the same reason: written inside the spawn closure, where the only way to reach them is to spawn — and the passing path spawns sudo. So nothing ever demonstrated either one firing. THE SUBSET CHECK WAS ALSO TAUTOLOGICAL. `permitted` came from the same constants memberEnv builds childEnv from, so it was empty under every edit where that holds — the exact criticism that retired NEVER_ENV. Worse, it lost the one live trigger the denylist had: a credential added to ALLOWED_ENV used to throw, and under the subset check widened the permitted set in the same motion and passed silently. That is the realistic future edit and it was the one left unguarded. Now both, and the denylist tests the LIST rather than the instance, so it fires on exactly that edit. Extracted as `assertEnvSafe` so a test can pass a poisoned allowlist — the guards being untestable in place is why they were decorative twice. THE BINARY CHECK WOULD HAVE THROWN ON EVERY TURN. Anthropic's installer puts a symlink at ~/.local/bin/claude into a versioned directory; resolve() does not follow symlinks, so the string compare matched only while `command` arrived as the symlink spelling, and would have failed the moment anything upstream normalised it — at exactly the point the hook gets wired. Compared through realpathSync on both sides now, per turn and never cached, since `claude update` moves the target. Nine tests pin all of it: a poisoned allowlist, a stray key, each NEVER_ENV name, and the symlink/target/missing-path cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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2bd96a9a98 |
tell a member why their agent is not working, instead of 403
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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6a85ca5d1f |
the binary check that was a comment, and a guard that could fire
Four fixes from the live server's review. One was a real defect.
THE BINARY WAS NEVER CHECKED. spawn-as-member passed `command` from the SDK
through untouched while a comment claimed the member's own install was what ran.
Since claude-manager resolves the OWNER'S CLAUDE_BIN at module load, wiring the
hook would have exec'd the owner's binary as the member — the precise confusion
this file exists to prevent, asserted in prose and enforced nowhere. Now throws
unless the command resolves to claudeBinIn(run.home).
NEVER_ENV COULD NOT FIRE. It tested an environment that memberEnv builds from
ALLOWED_ENV, so a denied name was already impossible; it was also missing six
credential variables the installed SDK reads. Replaced with the subset check the
reviewer proposed: anything not in ALLOWED_ENV or {HOME, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR} is a
leak whatever it is called. Complete by construction, and it cannot rot as the
SDK grows variables — which the denylist provably had already.
Also: one derivation of the binary path instead of two (install resolved from
the email, exec from the home — fine until they disagree), and the constraint
that ALLOWED_ENV may never hold a secret written at the list itself, since
`env K=V` in the argv is visible in /proc/<pid>/cmdline to every account.
Not acted on, and said so in COMMS: their finding that the 711 in
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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62e98dff2e |
a member's claude is their own binary and their own login
First half of per-user Claude. Provisioning and the privilege drop, not yet
wired to a turn — the chat gates stay up and behaviour is unchanged for
everyone. Committed unfinished on purpose so the reasoning is on the record
before the server agent runs any of it; the state is written up in
COMMS/sidecar-app-store/2026-08-11-per-user-claude-handoff.md.
THE CLAIM THAT CHANGED. docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md:226-229 says the Agent
SDK "has nowhere to put a uid", so a member's turn has to become its own
process — a change of shape rather than a flag. It is a flag:
sdk.d.ts:951 exposes spawnClaudeCodeProcess, documented for exactly this ("run
Claude Code in VMs, containers, or remote environments"), and node's spawn
already satisfies the SpawnedProcess shape it wants. So no second sidecar, no
PM2 entry, no inverted transport, and none of the registry rework a second
instance would have forced (registration is name-keyed and evicts its
namesake; the nine claude verbs resolve by capability with no selector).
THE PLATFORM NEVER RUNS AS A MEMBER. The tempting reading of "each member runs
their own Claude" is a second officer-agent under their uid, and it is wrong:
that sidecar needs POSTGRES_URL and the JWT signing secret, so a member-uid
process holding them could read every account and sign a token as the owner —
strictly more than their shell can do, and already forbidden by the .env boot
check. The harness stays the service user's; the thing that runs the member's
code and holds the member's credential is theirs. That is the pty sidecar's
shape, not a new one.
PER-MEMBER BINARY, deliberately, over one shared /usr/local/bin/claude. The
private part is the credential, not the executable — but claude updates itself,
and a root-owned binary is one a member cannot update, which turns "my agent is
a version behind" into a request to the owner. Same installer the owner's own
install uses, run as them, in their home. Idempotent by skipping when present
rather than re-running: the retry button reprovisions on every press.
ALLOWLIST, NOT A FILTER, for the child's environment. At the moment of the call
the calling process holds POSTGRES_URL, the JWT secret and the owner's
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY; setpriv --reset-env means nothing crosses unless written
into the argv, so an allowlist is the complete answer to what a turn can see,
and a denylist would have to be right about every variable added later.
NEVER_ENV throws rather than leaks if someone widens it.
Login is the member's own act against their own account. The platform cannot do
it for them and must not try — the alternative is lending them the owner's
credential. claudeLoginState only reports whether the credential has appeared,
and reads it as the member, so a true answer means their process can reach it.
NOT VERIFIED: any of it at runtime. tsgo passes; nothing has been provisioned
and the spawn hook has never been called. If it turns out setpriv breaks how
the SDK reaches the process, this approach is wrong and the fallback is the
earlier plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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401dcb710c |
a blessed directory for container bind mounts
From a live-server report: a bind-mounted postgres:18-alpine crash-looped with
`mkdir: can't create directory '…/18/docker'` on a directory that already existed.
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f0af7237db |
terminal, chat and files are granted by default; permissions screen simplified
DEFAULTS. Every role now starts with the three confined capabilities at write, seeded in bootstrap. These are what the platform is FOR — an account that signs in and reaches none of them is not restricted, it is useless, and making the owner grant them by hand first is a step with no decision in it. Seeded as real rows rather than implied by absence, which keeps the table's one rule intact: a missing row means no access, always, with no exception to remember. Revoking one therefore works like revoking anything else — the row goes and nothing puts it back. Done in bootstrap because that happens exactly once per install, so seeding can never fight a later revocation. Non-fatal: an owner whose roles hold nothing is a one-click fix, while failing bootstrap over it leaves a platform with no account at all. `app` capabilities are deliberately not defaulted — they reach data the owner may not intend to share, and each needs a sidecar before it means anything. SCREEN. Role selection is tabs rather than a dropdown: three roles are the axis you move along, and a select hid two of them behind a click while giving no sense of which one you are editing. Row descriptions are gone — with three rows called Terminal, Chat and Files they explained nothing — and the "needs a Linux account" warning went with them, since every account now gets one at creation, so it was noise about a state that no longer occurs on its own. `needsOsAccount` is removed from the API too, not just hidden. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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3bea46f2d7 |
rootless docker per member — provisioning works, running a container does not yet
Not finished. Committed because the diagnosis is worth more than the code. WHY ROOTLESS AND NOT THE DOCKER GROUP. `usermod -aG docker <user>` is the one-line version and it is root: `docker run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host` is a root shell, which reads .env, every other member's home and the wallet seed. Every boundary from today, bypassed by one documented command. Rootless gives what was actually asked for — a daemon per account, containers in that account's user namespace, images in their own home. VERIFIED on this host: provisioning succeeds, the server reports 29.5.0, the daemon runs as the member, `docker pull` puts 403 MB under their own home, and `docker ps -a` shows nothing while the owner has four containers. That last line is the isolation, measured. NOT VERIFIED: actually running a container. It failed, and the cause is an interaction between two things built today: failed to copy xattrs: failed to set xattr "system.posix_acl_default" on …/volumes/…/_data Creating a volume copies xattrs, and the DEFAULT ACLs on a member's home — added so the file browser could read their files — are inherited by Docker's storage, where a mapped id inside a user namespace is not a valid id to set. Both features correct alone. The fix here strips default ACLs from ~/.local/share/docker only, leaving the access ACLs the file browser needs. That fix is UNPROVEN. The re-test failed for a different, environmental reason: probe users recycle uid 1001, and a stale lingering systemd user manager from a previous probe answered `systemctl --user`, so the unit appeared not to exist. Cleaned with `loginctl terminate-user`. Retest on a machine that has not had a uid-1001 user, or on a fresh uid. Also worth knowing before this ships: uid reuse after deleting a member is a real hazard, not just a test artefact — the next member gets the previous member's uid, and anything left lingering belongs to them. setup.sh gains uidmap and dbus-user-session as core packages; the shell template exports DOCKER_HOST from $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR when the socket exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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71589aee99 |
a member's terminal looks like the owner's
A new Linux account opens a shell with nothing: useradd copies /etc/skel, which on Ubuntu is a bash rc, and the account's shell is zsh — so it got no prompt, no history, no completion, no colour. "Their own account" should not mean a worse terminal than the owner's. src/servers/shell-skel/zshrc is the template, and scripts/starship.toml is reused rather than copied: setup.sh already deploys it for the owner, so one file serves both audiences and they cannot drift. Seeded by provisionOsAccount, which means the retry button applies it to accounts that already exist — no delete-and-recreate. The template depends on nothing but zsh. Starship, eza, nvim, bun, deno and cargo are each used only if present, and every path is $HOME-relative — the owner's own .zshrc has three absolute /home/pastilhas paths in it, which is exactly what a template must not inherit. Without starship it falls back to a zsh prompt showing the same information, because a shell that opens with a broken prompt reads as a broken machine. Never overwrites: written only when the file is ABSENT. ~/.zshrc.local is sourced last and never written, so there is somewhere to put your own config that no future template can reach. Three fixes found by running it: - install -D creates missing parents but applies -o/-g only to the FILE, so ~/.config came out root:root — readable but not writable by its owner, which would have surfaced weeks later as one tool mysteriously failing. The parent is now created explicitly. - useradd took its shell from process.env.SHELL, which under PM2 is whatever PM2 was launched from. A member's shell depended on how the server happened to be started. Now chosen from what is installed: zsh, else bash. - the pty sidecar spawned ITS $SHELL for a member, not theirs. It now execs their passwd shell via sh -c, so the login shell in /etc/passwd is the one they get. starship moves out of the light-profile skip. The light profile exists to serve a file browser, a terminal and chat — the terminal is one of its three reasons to be, and it is what every member gets. Leaving starship out meant the fallback prompt on exactly the installs most likely to have members. oh-my-zsh, eza and lazygit stay full-only. Verified in a real member shell: zsh from passwd, HISTFILE in their own home, eza-backed ll, starship active, EDITOR=nvim, and an edit to .zshrc surviving a reprovision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhas
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e4acf19a35 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitea/master' into sidecar-app-store | ||
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4d4a253f72 |
terminal runs as the member; chat is grantable and still refused
TERMINAL is confined now, and the shell is genuinely theirs. The pty sidecar spawns it through sudo setpriv as their own account, in their own home, with the platform's environment cleared. Verified end to end against the sidecar's own socket: id -u 1001, not 1000 file the shell wrote owned by ptyprobe ps -o user=,args= ptyprobe /bin/zsh -i env | grep -c POSTGRES 0 osUser and home are resolved in upgradeWs from the authenticated account, and whatever the browser sent under those names is DELETED first. The bridge forwards the query string to the sidecar untouched and the sidecar starts a shell from what it finds there, so trusting the client for either would let a member ask for the owner's uid in a query parameter. node-pty does support uid/gid, unlike Bun.spawn, and they are deliberately unused: they set the ids without applying the account's groups or resetting the environment, so the shell would keep the owner's groups and everything Bun loaded from .env. Also closes the pty identity blindness in TODO.md. Sessions record whose they are, list and kill scope to the caller, and re-attaching to a session belonging to another account is refused — otherwise a member resumes someone else's shell by guessing an id that travels in a query string. Measured: member killing the owner's session -> ok:false, owner killing it -> ok:true. CHAT is confined so the owner can grant it and the route resolves, and both execution doors refuse a non-owner: the router wholesale, and the socket in server.tsx. The agent has not moved — the SDK spawns claude itself with nowhere to put a uid, and every transcript path resolves through the owner's home, so a member would read the owner's session list and run an agent as the owner. Reads are refused too, because listClaudePwds returns the names of the owner's projects. A deliberate, temporary gap at the owner's request: permission and route now, function when a turn can be spawned under runAs with the member's own HOME. Both guards say so, and the registry test names them so a future edit cannot move one without the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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eda004a46d |
a naked platform does not describe what it does not have
Reversing my own call from an hour ago. I built the denied-route screen to EXPLAIN the absence — "Music is not installed", with a link to the app store — and argued a redirect erases what you asked for. The owner's correction is the better principle: a server should not know about a sidecar it does not have. Explaining Music is the app describing a feature that, as far as this install is concerned, does not exist, and it leaks the whole catalogue of what could be installed to any member who types a URL. So a denied path is now indistinguishable from an unknown one: redirect home, the same answer App.tsx's path="*" already gave. One behaviour for a member without a grant, an owner without the sidecar, and a typo. Nothing disclosed. The Permissions screen loses both explanatory blocks for the same reason. One listed every capability whose sidecar is absent — a catalogue of uninstallable features presented as a permissions decision. The other described chat, tasks, the desktop and the wallet as "not grantable" to an owner who may have none of them installed. `notInstalled` is gone from the API too, not just hidden in the UI. What is on that screen is what this server can actually do. Still short of what the owner described, and worth naming rather than implying otherwise: routes are DECLARED in App.tsx for every screen and this hides the ones that should not resolve. The end state is routes REGISTERED from the manifests of installed sidecars, so an uninstalled feature has no route to hide. The manifests already exist and the dock is already built from them; the router is not, yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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b4f88ec161 |
routes refuse at the route, and a new home is empty
Three things, from a member sitting on /music with no music capability on a server with no music sidecar: an empty library, and 403s in the console. PERMISSIONS AT THE ROUTE. `canVisit` filtered the dock and nothing else, so the tile was hidden and the route was wide open — typing the path, following an old link or restoring a tab rendered the screen anyway. RouteGate now wraps every screen in one place, inside the error boundary. It does not redirect. Sending someone to `/` erases what they asked for and reads as a bug: they clicked Music and landed on Home. It says why instead, and the URL stays put so a reload after installing the thing just works. And it says which of the two reasons applies, because they need different screens and send the reader to different places. `not-installed` is a fact about the SERVER — the owner gets a link to the app store. `not-granted` is a fact about the ACCOUNT, and only the owner can change it. Presenting either as the other sends you looking in the wrong place. ROUTES FOLLOW THE SIDECAR. Free, once the above exists: `deniedRoutes` already covers "held but its sidecar is not installed", so an uninstalled feature has no tile AND no screen. The dock, the Permissions list and the routes now agree because they read one answer. NO MORE SEEDING. Downloads/Documents/Music/Videos/Pictures are gone from both places that made them — the member's provisioning and, older and worse, `/ls`, which created folders in somebody's home as a side effect of LOOKING at it. A listing that invents its own contents is a listing you cannot trust, and the platform has no standing to choose a person's folder layout. A new home is empty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4b058a6703 |
fix the sign-out reload loop I shipped an hour ago
The 401 handler ended with location.replace('/'), guarded by "unless the path starts
with /signin". There is no /signin route — the sign-in screen IS path="/". So every 401
on the signed-out landing page navigated to the page it was already on, fetched again,
401'd again. A hard refresh loop with no way out of the tab.
The reload was never what fixed anything: useAuth already renders the sign-in screen
when there is no token. It only existed to drop a stale query cache. So it is now the
last thing attempted and bounded three separate ways, any one of which breaks a loop
alone:
1. no token -> return. A 401 while already signed out is expected, not a revocation.
This one alone ends it, because a reloaded document has nothing left to clear.
2. once per document, module flag.
3. once per tab, sessionStorage marker — which also covers a host that re-injects the
token on every load, where clearing storage cannot help and guard 1 never fires.
Anyone stuck in the loop from the previous build: localStorage.clear() in the console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
d3bed0add9 |
the file browser can actually read a member's home, and plans is gone
"This folder is empty" was a lie. The five seeded directories were sitting there and the platform's readdir raised EACCES: a member's home is 700 and owned by them, which is correct for a shell and locks out the file browser, which runs inside the platform process. /ls caught the error and returned an empty listing, so a refusal looked exactly like data. Two doors, two boundaries, and that is the point rather than a compromise. The terminal and the agent RUN AS the member and the kernel is the boundary there. The file browser acts on the member's behalf from inside the platform, which already applies its own containment and is the owner's process on the owner's machine — it can read anything via sudo regardless. Giving it access describes who is doing the work. Done with named POSIX ACLs, because it has to hold in BOTH directions: a file the platform writes must be editable by the member and vice versa. Mode bits cannot say that — whichever party is neither owner nor group lands in "other", and widening "other" opens the home to every account on the box. A shared group fails the same way, since both parties would have to be in it and that puts every member in a group that can read every other member's home. Two named entries plus `d:` defaults grant exactly two users and are inherited by whatever either side creates, whatever their umask. Verified: platform lists the home, member edits a platform-written file, platform edits a member-written file, and a SECOND member is refused on both ls and cat. /ls now distinguishes EACCES from a missing directory. An empty result is data and must never be how a refusal looks. acl joins the core packages in setup.sh — the alternative is an account that provisions and then cannot list its own home. Also: the file browser's own useTasks/useAgents fired /tasks, /agents and both category endpoints on every render, which is where the last four 403s came from — they are the context menu's Run Task and agent submenus, execution-only. Gated. And plans is deleted: router, screen, routes, dock tile, hook, page title and its capability. It read markdown from <repo>/plans, which does not exist. Fresh-install Permissions is now Files alone, with Terminal to come. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
6b4fed68fd |
gitea leaves the baseline and becomes an app-store install
It was in both light profiles on the reasoning that it fronts a REMOTE instance and so needs nothing installed locally. That is true and it was beside the point: a baseline process appears in the dock and in the Permissions screen whether or not anyone ever gave it a URL, so a fresh server offered to grant members access to a Gitea that did not exist. "Is Gitea here" had two answers that could disagree. Now it is `existing` mode with a URL and a token, like any other remote service, and the one place that says whether it is here is the install row. No compose template and no `provisioned` mode: Gitea is always something the owner already runs, and offering to spin one up would mean owning its migration, backup and upgrade story. members: 'none' — not because Gitea is single-tenant, it is the most per-user service in the catalogue, but because there is nothing for the INSTALLER to do. The owner's connection carries the instance; each member adds their own access token from /gitea and acts only as themselves upstream. A provisioner would need an admin token and would mint credentials on their behalf, which is more authority than this needs. The catalogue test already pinned "the store offers exactly what light leaves out", so removing it from the profile is what forced the entry to exist. Both light profiles changed together — the mac one carried the same comment and the same gap. Permissions on a fresh install is now Files and Plans. Plans stays because it reads the platform's own shipped markdown from <repo>/plans, not anyone's disk, so it needs nothing installed and exposes nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
e393d0f5c2 |
a member's screens render, and the shell stops asking for things it cannot have
Three findings from granting Files to a role and signing in as the member. THE BLANK SCREEN. WorkspaceView returns null until workspace.isLoaded, and isLoaded was the success flag of GET /api/dashboards — which the `dashboards` capability gated. So a member with files granted got a completely blank Files screen and no request to /api/file-browser at all: the panel never mounted. Terminal, Chat and every other workspace screen were the same. /api/dashboards is not a feature. It is the per-user key-value store where every screen keeps its layout, entirely `personal`, every row keyed to the caller. Gating it does not restrict an account, it breaks it — which is the definition of `core` at the top of the registry. Moved there. And the failure mode was wrong independently: `isLoaded` now covers a failed fetch as well as a successful one, with `loadFailed` for the difference, so a screen that cannot remember its layout still renders with defaults instead of showing nothing and explaining nothing. THE STRAY REQUESTS. Six shell-level queries gated on isAuthenticated but not on capability, so a member's first paint fired 403s at /server-settings/settings, /jobs/counts (every three seconds, forever), /chat/models, /plans, /music/now-playing and the chat access policy. Each now checks the capability it needs. JobsIndicator and RescanButton also render nothing without `tasks` and `items` — the header was offering two links to a screen the member cannot open and a button that would 403. THE PERMISSIONS SCREEN. It listed all fourteen app capabilities on a server where none of their sidecars are installed. Offering to grant Photos on a machine with no Immich is not a permission decision. It now shows only what is installed, lists the rest as "nothing installed for these yet" so their absence reads as a fact rather than a bug, and marks confined rows as needing a Linux account. Fails open on a degraded read. Found while checking that: the headscale catalogue entry claimed only the `headscale` capability, but the same sidecar also serves `vpn` — a member enrolling their own device — so vpn was never subtracted. Hence `alsoServes`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2c9d4e55aa |
retry a linux account in place instead of deleting the person
POST /users/:id/provision-linux, and a terminal button on each user row. One
operation covering three needs that were all previously answered by "delete the
account and make it again":
backfill an account created before the feature existed, or while the host was not
set up for it
retry the first attempt failed for something since fixed — the traversable
ancestor chmod being the one everybody hits once
re-key replace authorized_keys with a new public key
Deleting to redo a retryable side effect throws away the password, the dashboards and
everything else keyed to the row.
The provisioning block moves out of create-user into provisionOsAccount, shared by
both entry points for the same reason app-store/members.ts is shaped that way: two
moments, one piece of work.
Found by testing the retry rather than the create: provisionUserDirs re-chmods every
directory including home, and home belongs to the MEMBER after the first successful
run — chmod requires ownership, so it threw EPERM and took every retry down before it
started. Those chmods are now a default for directories being created, not an
assertion about ones that already exist; os-user.ts sets the home's mode through sudo
and is the authority for it.
The route answers 200 with the error in the body, because the interesting cases are
partial: "the account exists and is confined but the keys failed" is not nothing
having happened, and the row shows both halves.
Verified end to end: blocked ancestor reports the chmod and leaves osUser null, the
retry after that chmod succeeds and records the row, and a re-key replaces
authorized_keys without rotating the outbound key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
ea0d2396f7 |
linux accounts use the chosen username, and refuse to take one over
Two changes, and the second is what makes the first safe. The officer_ prefix is gone: a member's account is the username the owner typed, so whoami says who they are and a commit from their checkout is attributed to something recognisable. Measured first — useradd on this host accepts everything validateUsername permits, including dots, hyphens, underscores and uppercase. The prefix was also load-bearing, though, and not for looks. ensureOsUser REUSES an existing account, which is what makes it re-runnable, and that was safe by construction while only we created officer_* names. Unprefixed, adoption becomes the dangerous path: a platform account named root would have found root in passwd, and every runAs for that member would have been a root shell. So adoption now requires the existing account's passwd home to be exactly the home we are about to confine — that is what makes it ours — and any uid below 1000 is refused outright. Verified: root and daemon refused as system accounts, and the owner's own username refused by name with its real home quoted back. Also, the ancestor trap from the first real install. A member's home is under DATA_PATH, which is under the OWNER'S home, and /home/<owner> is 750 on Debian and Ubuntu — so every mode bit on the account tree was right, the directory existed, and the member still could not reach it for want of x four levels up. It surfaced as "ssh-keygen: Could not stat …/.ssh: Permission denied", which points at the wrong thing entirely. firstUntraversableAncestor now walks the chain as the member before anything uses the home, and the error names the directory and the chmod. The dev machine was already 751, and the probe used /tmp, so it never crossed the ancestor that mattered. Worth remembering as a shape of mistake. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
0281ca62d2 |
a deleted or blocked account loses its session on the next request
Reported from two browser windows: an account deleted from the dashboard survived a page refresh in the other one. Two independent halves. Server: userMiddleware looked the account up, then read the result as `dbUser?.passwordChangedAt` — so a DELETED account fell through the optional chain and the request proceeded on a token that is still cryptographically valid, for up to the full 30 days. `status` was the same hole from the other direction: signin refuses anything that is not Active, but nothing rechecked it afterwards, so marking someone Blocked did not end the session they already had, which is exactly when you would be doing it. Now the account must exist and be Active on every request. Client: nothing reacted to a 401 at all. onError fed the bug-report form and stopped there, so the window kept rendering off cached React Query data. A 401 now clears every storage key createClient reads and returns to the sign-in screen. /auth/ is exempt because a wrong password is also a 401 and reloading the form would look like a crash. window.officerBearerToken was declared non-optional, which made "there is no token" unspeakable. It has always been one of five sources, any of which may be absent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4d513c0e13 |
files, for a member, in their own home
Introduces a fifth capability kind. `files` was `execution` — never grantable, because it meant the OWNER'S filesystem. It is now `confined`: execution-shaped, but the kernel enforces the boundary because the account has its own Linux user, its own home, and no permission above it. The rule that makes `confined` mean something lives in authorize.ts, once: a confined grant is DROPPED for an account with no osUser. So "granted but unconfined" resolves to no access rather than to the owner's home — which is what it would otherwise resolve to, since getOwnerHomeDir ignores the email it is handed whenever HOME_DIR is set. One rule covers the HTTP routes, the websocket doors and the dock, instead of each router remembering. resolveHomeDir(userId) is the new seam and it reads the row rather than the token, for the same reason authorize.ts re-reads role: provisioning a Linux account for an existing member has to take effect on the next request, not in thirty days. The file browser resolves it in middleware and puts it on ctx user, because getRootDir is called from fifteen places in that router. Making it async would have meant editing fifteen call sites, and the cost of missing one is serving the owner's home to a member. Now a handler cannot run without the answer. Two things a real run caught: - /ls seeds Downloads/Documents into the home as the service user, which is EPERM against a 700 home owned by the member — it took the whole listing down. Seeding is now best-effort there and happens at provision time instead, as the member. - .unique() on os_user made db:push ask whether to TRUNCATE users, which is unanswerable non-interactively. uniqueIndex instead, per databases/CLAUDE.md. Verified: a member without a Linux account is refused by name; with one, resolves to their own home and NOT to HOME_DIR; the owner still resolves to HOME_DIR; and every .. escape is refused while an absolute path is rebased under the root. Terminal is still execution — that is the next stage. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
0fb9a29e64 |
ssh for a member's linux account, both directions
Inbound and outbound are two keys doing two jobs, and treating them as
alternatives breaks the goal:
inbound ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, from an optional public key the owner pastes
on the create form. Their private half stays on their laptop.
outbound ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, generated in their home, never leaves the machine.
"They pasted a key, so skip generating one" is the obvious simplification. Agent
forwarding covers a human in an interactive session, but a platform-spawned agent
has no agent socket to borrow — so an edge checkout it is asked to commit and push
needs a key that lives on the box. The inbound key is therefore optional and the
outbound one is not.
No linux password, ever: useradd sets none, which blocks password login and does
not block key auth. So "real user, reachable over SSH, no password anywhere" is
the resting state, and the platform password stays the platform's business.
Validation is about line count, not key shape. Every line of authorized_keys is a
credential, so a pasted value with a newline would install a SECOND key silently.
Multi-line refused, a private key refused by name, an options prefix refused.
Every write goes through sudo install: the home is 700 and the member's, so the
service user cannot even create .ssh. install sets content, owner and mode in one
step, and content travels as a temp path so nothing quotes a form value into a
shell. ssh-keygen runs AS the member so the private key is never briefly root's.
known_hosts is not seeded — StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new instead. The Gitea
SSH endpoint is not knowable at create time, and the default setting makes a first
connection prompt, which in a non-interactive agent turn is a hang rather than an
error. accept-new still refuses a changed host key.
The generated public key is stored on the row and shown twice: on the after-create
panel and behind a key button on the user's row. It has an errand attached that
nothing else will remind anyone about — it must be added to their Gitea account.
Verified with a real useradd: .ssh 700 and id_ed25519 600 both owned by the member
and usable by them, authorized_keys byte-identical to the paste, no key rotation on
a second run, and a multi-line paste refused with authorized_keys untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
5c7ceb2283 |
per-user linux accounts, stage 1: the account and the privilege drop
A member gets a real Linux account whose home is the directory the platform already
provisions for them. Nothing uses it yet — this is the mechanism plus the account,
deliberately with no behaviour change, so the file browser and terminal can be moved
onto something already proven.
Bun.spawn silently ignores uid/gid. Verified on 1.3.10: from uid 1000,
Bun.spawn(['id','-u'], {uid: 65534}) exits 0 and prints 1000. No throw, no warning.
Bun's types don't declare the option so typed code can't reach it by accident, but the
runtime accepts it, and a silently absent isolation boundary is the worst outcome this
feature could have. So privilege drops go through sudo -n setpriv, and a test pins Bun's
behaviour — if it's ever implemented, that test tells us we may simplify.
sudo is required for the drop and not because of the uid: --init-groups fails with
"Operation not permitted" for an unprivileged caller even when reuid'ing to its own
account, because setgroups(2) is root-only. --reset-env is what stops the platform's
environment crossing; verified POSTGRES_URL is unset on the far side and HOME arrives
from the target's passwd entry.
Three bugs that only a real run with a real useradd could find:
- chmod after chown fails forever, because chmod needs ownership. Both orderings fail
unprivileged. Both operations now go through sudo, which is what makes it re-runnable.
- a member could read ANOTHER member's home: provisionUserDirs created at the default
umask (755) and only the account being created got confined. An unlistable parent is
no protection when the child is world-readable and emails are guessable. The skeleton
is now created closed, 711 on the account dir and 700 inside.
- platform/.env was 664 and a member's shell printed JWT_SECRET, which is enough to mint
an owner token and bypass every capability check. Now a boot check that refuses to
start with OFFICER_OS_USERS on while any .env in the project root is group- or
world-readable.
Design, the measured results and the staging plan: docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
69a31051ac |
the owner can create accounts
POST /api/users plus an Add-account form in Settings > User management. Until now createUser had one call site — bootstrap, gated on an empty user table — so every non-owner account anywhere had been inserted into Postgres by hand. Created accounts are Active. The column defaults to Unverified and signin refuses anything else with a bare UNAUTHORIZED, which is exactly what made the hand-INSERT route look like a wrong password. Also closes a hole found while reading the write path: a second Super Admin was storable. The CHECK constraint pins user 1's role but cannot see other rows, and getOwnerUser() was LIMIT 1 with no ORDER BY, so two holders would have made "who owns this server" a question the query plan answered — and that answer feeds the agent sidecar's identity, vault access and origin scoping. Both write paths now refuse the role and getOwnerUser() orders by id. USER_DIRS and provisionUserDirs move into data-path.ts so the create handler and scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts cannot disagree about what an account's skeleton is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
801eba9284 |
say which harness owns a chat row, on both kinds
The list is merged from two stores and only OpenCode rows were badged, so Claude was marked by the ABSENCE of a badge — legible only if you already knew the list mixes two harnesses. Both carry one now, and since `harness` is absent on older Claude rows, anything not OpenCode reads as Claude, matching the server's own default. The badge no longer replaces the message count, it sits before it: the count is real on Claude rows and a hardcoded 0 on OpenCode ones (the session list has no count field and a real one costs an HTTP call per row), so those rows show the badge and no count rather than a zero that means "never asked". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
adaaba658c |
list opencode sessions from every project, not just the serve's own
An opencode session in a git directory never appeared in /chat. The list read GET /session,
which answers for ONE project — the one the request's directory resolves to, and with no
x-opencode-directory header that is the serve's own cwd, DATA_PATH/opencode_server. Not a git
checkout, so it resolves to the catch-all project `global`, along with every other non-git
directory. That is why the default chat dir listed fine and nothing looked broken: a cwd that
IS a checkout gets its own project, and chat pwds are checkouts.
Measured on the live serve before changing anything: /session returned 8 sessions, /api/session
13, the five missing ones being an old project's. A session created in a git directory came back
0 times from /session and 1 from /api/session.
/api/session spans projects, so that is now the list. The per-id reads stay on /session — they
answer for any session regardless of project, verified 200 with and without the header.
The trap, and the reason listSessions normalises rather than returning the response: the two
surfaces disagree in silence. /session carries the working directory as top-level `directory`,
/api/session as `location.directory` with no top-level field, inside a {data: …} envelope.
Swapping the endpoint without the mapping leaves `directory` undefined on every session, which
the cwd filter turns into an empty list — the same shape as the metadata.officer.cwd bug this
filter already had once.
Verified against the live serve: with the mapping, a session in a git directory and one in the
general chat dir both resolve to their cwd, and every session carries a directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
9d2da49572 |
re-land the client half: hold the socket across a remount, and queue what was typed
Three commits backed out a few hours ago as collateral, restored together because they are one fix: |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
d9857eef7c |
re-land: deliver a chat turn to every socket watching it, not the newest one
This is |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
b89a562614 |
back out tonight's socket changes
Reverts |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
66a41d0813 |
reclaim a connecting socket instead of orphaning it
Follow-up to
|
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
bc13450fad |
stop closing the chat socket on every remount, again
Re-applies |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
31ffe084f5 |
revert the second server too: one officer, one token, this origin
Andre wants to log out and log back in against a single server, so this takes out |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
52d567874f |
authenticate the chat socket the same way every request is authenticated
Reported after the revert: the app loads, the old layout is back, history lists — and the socket never reaches connected. The two doors disagreed. `createClient` accepts a token from seven places: window.officerBearerToken, two body datasets, an `?officerToken=` query param, PERTENTO_EDITOR_AUTH_TOKEN, localStorage and sessionStorage. The chat socket url read exactly one of them, `localStorage.BEARER_TOKEN`, so a token held anywhere else authenticated every HTTP request and left the WebSocket with a bare `?token=`. That failure is silent and reads as a dead server: verified here, an empty token closes with 1002 "Expected 101 status code", and the hook's retry loop repeats it forever. Nothing logs a missing credential, so the app looks fine in every way except the one that matters. Resolution is now one exported function, `resolveBearerToken`, used by both. The point is that it cannot be re-spelled: this bug is the second spelling drifting from the first. Predates the tabs work and survived reverting it, which is the evidence it was never a panes bug. Not fixed here, same shape, left alone deliberately: Terminal, Desktop, AudioStreamPlayer, the pipeline and task runners, JobDetail and EmailList all build socket or fetch urls from `localStorage.BEARER_TOKEN` directly and will fail identically for the same user. Typecheck clean. 600 pass, 2 fail — cliamp and pty, unchanged and unrelated. Not verified in a browser; Andre has the only client that reproduces it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
0a4ff548b9 |
revert the chat tabs and panes work, back to one conversation
Andre asked for zero, not another fix on top. Reverts ec4f06a..7726c9f — the ten commits from "tabs and panes" onward: the tab bar and pane splitting, tab renaming and its page title, the per-server directory picker, the render-loop fix, pane transcript resolution, the send queue, the two socket fixes from the other session, the pane-socket notes, and my own socket-set change from tonight. He is rebuilding from here. Deliberately KEPT: |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
7726c9fc71 |
let every client watching a chat receive it, not the newest one
Reported from two devices at once: typing on the iPad, reading the reply on the Mac. Sending from the Mac produced nothing there. Both halves are one field. A session held `ws`, a single socket, and `attachWs` assigned it. So the newest attach silently took the turn away from whoever was already watching — and with a tab now holding up to three panes, plus a phone and a laptop on the same conversation, several sockets per session stopped being exotic and became the ordinary case. Now a Set, and every message goes to all of them. `detachWs(sessionId)` was worse, because it named no socket: it nulled the field on ANY close. A stale client going away therefore killed delivery for the client that had attached after it, which is the "nothing happens on the Mac" half. It takes the socket now and removes only that one, and the idle GC is armed only once nothing is left watching — otherwise a close would collect a session another pane is still reading. endTurnIfAgentIsGone takes the whole set for the same reason: a cut-off notice explains a spinner that will otherwise never stop, and telling one of three clients leaves two spinning. Typecheck clean. 600 pass, 2 fail — cliamp path-escape and the pty transport test, both failing identically on master before this change. Nobody has clicked it; the two devices that reported it are the test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
cb7ab55cca |
stop asking what was playing, and say what the socket is doing
Two things. The music now-playing restore is disabled on the web. The music sidecar is not running on every machine that serves this app, so every page load fired /music/now-playing and logged a 503 in the console of a browser that was not there for music. Restoring a paused track is a nicety; a permanent error on every load of every screen is not. The player is untouched — it simply no longer asks what WAS playing. And the chat socket now logs its own lifecycle: create, open, close with code and whether it was stale or tearing down, every message received, and every message sent or queued with the socket readyState. window.__officerWs = false turns it off. This is instrumentation I should have added two rounds ago. A pane connects and then sits silent, and I have now reasoned from this hook source three times without explaining it — the browser says a socket closed and never says who closed it or whether the message left. The handover doc says instrument before theorising and I did not follow my own note. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
bcb3d6d621 |
stop closing the chat socket on every remount
A pane on a remote server never connected: the console showed the socket closing before the handshake finished, over and over, and the pane sat on Disconnected. The stack named it — commitPassiveUnmountEffectsInsideOfDeletedTree plus doubleInvokeEffectsOnFiber. The pane subtree is deleted and remounted, and the cleanup closed the socket each time, while it was still CONNECTING. The replacement was then closed in turn. React dev StrictMode double-invokes every effect on mount, so a fresh pane could churn forever and never hold a connection. The cleanup cannot tell a remount from a real unmount at the moment it runs, so it no longer tries: the close is deferred a tick and cancelled if the effect re-runs. A remount reclaims the live socket and the handshake completes; a real unmount has nobody to cancel it and closes a frame later, which costs nothing. Ruled out beforehand, by direct test: alpha accepts that exact key over wss on the first try, with and without a browser Origin. The server was never involved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |