headscale leaves the platform. 45 files move to plugins/offscale/ and the
platform stops knowing it exists.
api/router.ts the thin auth-gated proxy, now at /api/offscale
sidecar/ 18 files, the whole headscale contract and its admin keys
db/ schema + queries, offscale_servers
web/ 26 files as panels and a layout — no screen, per the rule
removed from the platform: the hono mount, the `headscale` capability, the
App.tsx route pair, the screen and its barrel, the AppRegistry spread, the
officerdev re-exports, the dock tile, the page-title rule, and both database
barrels. tsgo is clean and nothing references it.
the imports tell the story of what the plugin↔host API actually is. the sidecar
takes @@/sidecar/protocol, @@/sidecar/connect, @@/data-path and
@@/officer-url.mjs; the queries take officerdb/db and officerdb/crypto; the
schema takes officerdb/auth/schema for the one reference a plugin may make; the
web half takes useClient, copyToClipboard, WorkspaceView and TerminalView from
the officerdev barrel. all of it resolves because a plugin lives inside the repo
— no publishing, no version negotiation.
AND IT FOUND A REAL BUG IN THE INSTALLER. createSidecarProxy learns its port
from a one-shot `<name>:server` event and subscribes when the plugin's router is
first imported — at mount. install started the sidecar BEFORE mounting, so the
announcement fired into a void: process online, routes mounted, every request
answering `503 sidecar not available` until something forced a reconnect. it
would have hit every plugin with an http sidecar. `example` never caught it
because it has no listener to announce.
install and enable now mount before starting; disable still unmounts before
stopping. neither direction leaves a mounted route in front of a sidecar that
cannot be reached.
verified live: /api/offscale/_officer/servers answers {"servers":[]}, /offscale
and /offscale/nodes serve, the old /api/headscale is 404, the offscale
capability is registered from the manifest, and officer-offscale is online.
757 pass, same 10 pre-existing failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
.env now holds PORT and POSTGRES_URL. Every encryption and signing key lives in
$OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db — 0600, 0700 directory, owned by the
service user, created on first use.
The design doc planned to move ONE at-rest key into the store. What shipped
splits it: headscale, wallet, photos, jellyfin, invoiceshelf, vault and
service-connections each get their own, plus jwt. VAULT_STORE_KEY encrypted all
seven, so one leak opened all of them — and it was named after whichever plugin
needed it first, which is why it read as safe to change if you did not run a
vault. A core install bootstraps two, jwt and headscale; the rest appear when
their plugin first asks.
The file IS the secret. No second key unlocks it, because a key beside the store
it opens buys nothing. The gain was never secrecy, it is blast radius: bun
auto-loads .env into all twenty pm2 processes, so a key there is readable from
/proc/<pid>/environ of twenty processes — officer-music held the key that
decrypts wallet seed envelopes.
Two defects found by testing the store rather than reading it, both of which
would have shipped:
The WAL was 0644. Enabling WAL creates -wal and -shm at 0644 rather than
inheriting the database's mode, and a freshly written key lives in the WAL
before checkpoint — so the 0600 on the database was decorative. The 0700
directory covered it, but only until someone loosened the directory.
PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL takes an exclusive lock, and busy_timeout was set
AFTER it. With twelve concurrent openers, six died on that line with
SQLITE_BUSY. Every sidecar opens this store at boot, so they open it
simultaneously by definition: most of them would have failed to start on a cold
boot and none on a warm one. Fixed by ordering the pragmas; re-tested with
twelve racing processes, one key, one row.
crypto.ts takes a purpose as its first argument now, which the design doc had
explicitly promised would not happen — 32 call sites across seven query modules.
That promise is corrected in the doc rather than quietly dropped.
Also live, not just comments: wallet/upstream.ts gated wallet storage on
process.env.VAULT_STORE_KEY and would have reported "unconfigured" forever. It
asks the store now, and the question it answers changed — not "did somebody set a
variable" but "can this process open the store", since the key is created on
demand.
assertSecretsClosed covers the store, its directory and its WAL. The jwt key
mints owner tokens, so a member's shell reading it is strictly worse than the
.env leak that check was written for.
Not typechecked: node_modules is empty and installs are frozen, so the
officerdb/secret-store subpath could not be resolved at runtime here — verified
that officerdb/types fails identically, so it is the empty tree and not the new
export. The store module itself was tested directly: creation, idempotence across
processes, hasKey not creating, permissions, and the twelve-way race. Every
changed file parses; the setup section runs and degrades correctly when the
import is unavailable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- relay accepts new extension connections by closing old one (last wins, code 4000)
- extension recognizes code 4000 and stops auto-reconnect (shows "replaced" badge)
- fix ping interval race where old WS close handler killed new connection's pings
- retry CDP commands on "Session with given id not found" by re-attaching debugger
- describeError() maps known errors to user-friendly badge tooltips
- persisted relay tokens restored on server start
- user-scoped token salts, token regeneration/deletion endpoints
- extension download endpoint, integrations UI for browser relay setup
- browser relay env vars passed to pi-bridge sandboxes
- browser screen layout with chat panel and prompt prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5