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Commits
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12a9605b01 |
a commander's bound is a rule, not a list
the allow list shipped an hour ago was a snapshot. plugin permissions
register at mount, so a plugin installed after a commander was created was
missing from its list and failed as a bare 403 with nothing saying why —
and every future thing a commander is meant to do is exactly that shape:
notify a device, send mail, spawn a sub-agent, hand a transcription to an
idle one, reach a plugin that does not exist yet.
so a credential now narrows two ways, and both only subtract:
permissions an ALLOW list. exact, a snapshot. right for a credential
with one job.
excludedKinds kinds it may never reach, resolved against the LIVE
registry on every request. right for a credential whose
job is open-ended.
a commander gets the second: every kind except admin. bounded away from
installing plugins, managing users and roles and changing server settings,
forever — and open to everything the platform learns to do, with nothing
to re-issue. still intersected with the account, so for a member it
narrows itself against their role.
verified against the running server with a commander-shaped key: tasks,
notify, file-browser and the transcribe PLUGIN all reach their routes;
/api/users, /api/plugins and /api/roles are 403. the plugin case is the
one an allow list could not have passed — it was mounted long after any
key was minted.
the commander's CLAUDE.md says what it cannot do in the rule's own terms,
and that a 403 is an answer rather than a problem to route around.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
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e29a4ee380 |
a credential can be narrower than its holder
a commander is an agent working unattended for months, and the only
credential in the tree lived in the MCP tool server's environment where
the agent's own shell cannot see it. so the first one built here curled
the whisper container directly on localhost: right answer, wrong door, and
a door the platform does not control.
api_keys.permissions. null is what every key a human minted still is —
their full authority, exactly what the password that made it could do. a
list narrows: the credential reaches only those permission keys, and still
only where the account itself could. intersection, never union.
checked BEFORE the owner bypass, which is the whole point. a Super Admin
consults no grants table, so a token carrying the owner's identity is
unbounded by construction — fine for a browser session somebody is sitting
in front of, not fine for a process that runs for months. this is the only
thing in the platform that can bound them. verified against the running
server: an owner key scoped to [account] gets 200 on /api/user/settings
and 403 on /api/users, /api/tasks and /api/plugins.
it propagates. a narrowed credential can write a task and run it, so the
token buildTaskApiEnv hands that script carries the same narrowing —
otherwise the script comes back through the API with full authority and
the limit bought nothing. the gate stashes it on the request for the one
kind of route that passes authority onward.
POST /tasks/:name/run: runs a script task, waits, returns code and output.
both existing runners need something watching them — the socket needs a
live connection, a job needs somebody to open Jobs. a commander has
neither. deliberately not a job: transcribing a memo takes seconds and
produces a file, and a queue plus a row plus a progress bar is a screen
nobody opened between the request and the result.
script-run.ts is the third thing this needed and the one worth having on
its own. the socket runner, the job runner and now this each carried the
same twenty lines — materialize, INPUT_ env, positional args, resolve cwd,
mint the api env — identical, with nothing saying they had to stay that
way. they differ in how they REPORT, which is real and stays with each of
them. what the script SEES is now decided once.
a commander gets its key at creation, in officer.env at 0600 inside its own
directory, and CLAUDE.md tells it where and says plainly that a sidecar
listening on localhost with no auth is still the wrong door. a file rather
than an env var because the detached loop a commander arms is spawned by
the agent and inherits nothing the platform chose. deleting the commander
revokes the row — the directory removal takes the secret, not the thing
that makes it work.
default scope is everything except `admin`: a commander that can reach
nothing gets widened in a hurry rather than thought about, and installing
plugins, managing users and changing server settings are never part of a
watcher's job. it is a default, stored per key, and for a member it
narrows itself against their role.
also fixed: POST /command-hq/commanders/new never awaited
createCommanderDirectory, so a turn could spawn before its CLAUDE.md
existed — the exact ordering that redesign was for — and the cwd it
returned was a Promise serialising as {}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
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e35ff5c7ad |
stt leaves the platform for the transcribe plugin
Speech-to-text is now plugins/transcribe — sidecar, its own config, its own skill and a task for the file browser's context menu. The transcription logic moved BYTE FOR BYTE: 416 lines whose every decision has a reason attached, from the two-pass detect-then-transcribe to the 25 language priming prompts to timeout:false. Verified identical rather than assumed. Removed here: api/stt/, server-settings/stt.ts and its mount, POST /chat/stt, POST /file-browser/transcribe, the FileViewer handler behind the button hidden last release, the Settings screen, the dead useAudioRecording hook and the orphaned locale keys across all six locales. blobToWav stayed. It lived in the same file as the dead hook and is still used by DictateDialog — unrelated to STT, and deleting by file rather than by use is how that would have gone. No permission entry to remove: STT never had one, living under server-admin, chat and files. The registry count is unchanged and docs:check is green. The plugin ships a task that will not appear in the menu yet — the platform loads a plugin's skills, affordances and notifications from its own directory but not its tasks. That loader is the remaining piece of docs/plugin-capabilities.md and is deliberately not built here. 1426 pass, tsgo clean, 18 plugins discovered with none broken. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
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3c7f52ab77 |
PORT is read in one place, and it has no default
officer-url.mjs is now the only file in the tree that touches process.env.PORT.
Twenty-two others read it and supplied their own default; a value with
twenty-two sources is not configuration, it is twenty-two things to keep in sync,
and they had already drifted three ways.
It throws when PORT is unset rather than guessing. A default only covers the case
where .env was never loaded — which is not a machine anyone wants running,
because POSTGRES_URL is missing in the same breath. What the default bought was a
process that starts, binds somewhere unexpected, and fails later for a reason
that does not name the cause. Same posture as jwt.ts with JWT_SECRET.
It is .mjs, not .ts, and that is the whole reason this could be one file. pm2
launches officer-pty with node (ecosystem.config.cjs) and everything else with
bun; node cannot import TypeScript, so a .ts module would have left the pty
sidecar holding the only surviving copy of the default — precisely the thing
being removed. allowJs is already on, so the TS callers still get types. Verified
both runtimes import it, and that PUBLIC_URL-style overrides still work.
It also exports API_URL and OFFICER_API_URL, because nineteen sidecars were
independently building `ws://127.0.0.1:${PORT}` and two more were building the
http form. Those are one listener described in two protocols — no sidecar binds
anything — so they belong beside the port rather than being rediscovered per
file.
server.tsx now takes PORT as a number, so Number(PORT) at the serve site is gone.
Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every edited file parses
under `bun build --no-bundle`; node and bun both load the new module; the unset
and non-numeric paths were exercised; the pm2 profile still loads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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e72cae4830 |
one default port, and it is 9000
Every PORT fallback in the tree now says 9000. There were three answers to one question, each defensible where it was written and none of them visible from the others: server.tsx and 19 sidecars 5000 a default from before there was an installer user-instance.ts 9010 what scripts/setup-old/setup.sh really wrote .env.example 9000 what we told people to write 5000 goes first because macOS binds it — AirPlay Receiver has owned it since Monterey, so a dev server there fails to bind or gets shadowed by something that answers. All 22 sites moved together, which is the point. Changing the app alone would have turned a consistent-but-wrong default into a split one: the app on 9000 while nineteen sidecars still dialled 5000. 9010 was the interesting one. It was the only value that ever matched a real machine, because it is what the old installer wrote — and it was in the single file whose disagreement would have broken chat alone, with nothing else looking wrong. Its own comment records the same bug being fixed once already, within the file, by a change that left it disagreeing with everything outside it. Note what these defaults actually are: the sidecars bind nothing. user-instance.ts has no listener at all — it builds ws:// and http:// URLs that both address the app's single listener. So every one of these numbers is a guess at where the app is, for a value that .env always supplies. Worth removing rather than aligning, which is a separate change. Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every edited file parses under `bun build --no-bundle`; the pm2 profile loads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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06aac5478f |
always transcribe in the source language, and let tasks call the API
Three changes that Transcribe Audio needs. Whisper's translate mode only ever outputs English, so it cannot honour "translate into <language>" for anything else — it answered Portuguese audio with a rough English rendering instead of a transcript. The translate decision is gone and transcription is always faithful to the detected language; spokenLanguages now only breaks ties on clips Whisper is unsure about. Script tasks get OFFICER_API_URL / OFFICER_API_HOST / OFFICER_AUTH_TOKEN so they can call Officer's own endpoints rather than reimplementing server-side work. Requests go to 127.0.0.1 so nothing depends on DNS or the proxy, but origin validation matches Host against PUBLIC_URL, hence the separate host variable. `inline` accepts "ask", which offers both affordances in the runner — Run here streams into the modal, Run as job queues it. Useful when the same task can take a second or an hour depending on whether it was pointed at a file or a library. Existing true/false values behave exactly as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |