remove origin validation

ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN, ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC, and everything they gated. The flag
defaulted to ON, so none of it ran on a real install — what comes out is
documented defence in depth that was already switched off. The file said so
itself: "Both flags and their call sites come out once the tailnet is the
perimeter."

Origin was never authentication here in any case. An app's `officer://<hex>`
origin is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from
a shipped binary.

Gone: the two flags, isOriginAllowed, isOriginCheckDisabled, isMusicOriginExempt,
originValidationMiddleware, ORIGIN_RULES and the whole OFFICER_<APP>_ORIGIN
scheme, PUBLIC_URL's origin/host derivation, and origin-validation.test.ts, which
existed only to pin them. CORS now echoes whatever Origin it is given, which is
what every install already did.

What SURVIVES is the reason this needed care. origin-validation.ts held two
unrelated things, and the second was the global authorization gate — a valid
non-owner token reaches only what its role grants, deliberately NOT under the
flag because it is account-based rather than origin-based. Its own comment called
it "the airtight half". Deleting the file wholesale would have deleted
authorization.

So it moves to _middlewares/capability-gate.ts as capabilityGateMiddleware, with
the name matching what it does: nothing in it reads an Origin header any more.
hono.ts mounts it in the same position, ahead of every router.

origin-middleware.ts stays and is untouched — it extracts the Origin for six auth
handlers that log it, and for passkeys. Extraction, not validation.

Also updates every claim that rested on the old model: CLAUDE.md's security
section and repo map, docs/secret-store.md, docs/mobile-api-keys.md, and five
messages in machine-setup's Tailscale section which told the owner to set
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=false when declining a tailnet. That advice is now impossible to
follow, and the honest version is different: with no tailnet the token is the
whole lock, so put a proxy in front and restrict who can reach it.

Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every changed file parses;
the setup section was run and writes four variables now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/servers/api/vault/websocket.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import type { ServerWebSocket } from 'bun';
 import { resolveAuthToken } from '../../auth-token';
 import { isTokenBlacklisted } from 'officerdb';
 import { isSuperAdmin } from '../../super-admin';
-import { isOriginAllowed } from '../../_middlewares';
 import { getVaultServerWsUrl } from './sidecar-server';
 import { getValidAccessToken } from './token-store';
 
@@ -140,14 +139,13 @@ export const vaultWebsocket = {
 
 const PREFIX = '/api/vault';
 
-// Serve-level upgrade for /api/vault/notifications/* WebSockets. Origin-gated; the platform JWT rides the
-// query (?access_token= for SignalR, or ?token=). The session is validated in `open` (deferred). The
-// device never sends a Vaultwarden token — we inject the stored one upstream.
+// Serve-level upgrade for /api/vault/notifications/* WebSockets. The platform JWT rides the query
+// (?access_token= for SignalR, or ?token=) and the session is validated in `open` (deferred). The device
+// never sends a Vaultwarden token — we inject the stored one upstream.
+//
+// There was an isOriginAllowed gate here until 2026-08-13, removed with the rest of origin validation.
+// It had defaulted to allow-everything, so it refused nothing on a real install.
 export function upgradeVaultWs(req: Request, server: any): Response | undefined {
-  const origin = req.headers.get('origin') ?? undefined;
-  const host = req.headers.get('host') ?? undefined;
-  if (!isOriginAllowed(origin, host)) return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
-
   const url = new URL(req.url);
   const platformToken = url.searchParams.get('access_token') || url.searchParams.get('token') || '';
   if (!platformToken) return new Response('Unauthorized', { status: 401 });