remove origin validation
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN, ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC, and everything they gated. The flag defaulted to ON, so none of it ran on a real install — what comes out is documented defence in depth that was already switched off. The file said so itself: "Both flags and their call sites come out once the tailnet is the perimeter." Origin was never authentication here in any case. An app's `officer://<hex>` origin is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from a shipped binary. Gone: the two flags, isOriginAllowed, isOriginCheckDisabled, isMusicOriginExempt, originValidationMiddleware, ORIGIN_RULES and the whole OFFICER_<APP>_ORIGIN scheme, PUBLIC_URL's origin/host derivation, and origin-validation.test.ts, which existed only to pin them. CORS now echoes whatever Origin it is given, which is what every install already did. What SURVIVES is the reason this needed care. origin-validation.ts held two unrelated things, and the second was the global authorization gate — a valid non-owner token reaches only what its role grants, deliberately NOT under the flag because it is account-based rather than origin-based. Its own comment called it "the airtight half". Deleting the file wholesale would have deleted authorization. So it moves to _middlewares/capability-gate.ts as capabilityGateMiddleware, with the name matching what it does: nothing in it reads an Origin header any more. hono.ts mounts it in the same position, ahead of every router. origin-middleware.ts stays and is untouched — it extracts the Origin for six auth handlers that log it, and for passkeys. Extraction, not validation. Also updates every claim that rested on the old model: CLAUDE.md's security section and repo map, docs/secret-store.md, docs/mobile-api-keys.md, and five messages in machine-setup's Tailscale section which told the owner to set ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=false when declining a tailnet. That advice is now impossible to follow, and the honest version is different: with no tailnet the token is the whole lock, so put a proxy in front and restrict who can reach it. Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every changed file parses; the setup section was run and writes four variables now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -474,25 +474,9 @@ if ! skip; then
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ask_required ENV_PORT "Port Officer listens on" "${ENV_PORT:-9000}"
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ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT="${ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT:-18792}"
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# ── origin checking, decided by the machine rather than by a default ──
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#
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# ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN defaults to ON inside the platform, which CLAUDE.md says is
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# only defensible because the tailnet is the perimeter. So the value is written
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# explicitly here, from whether this machine actually has one.
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if tailnet_present; then
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ENV_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN="true"
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ORIGIN_WHY="tailscale0 is up, so the tailnet is the perimeter"
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else
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ENV_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN="false"
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ORIGIN_WHY="no tailnet on this machine, so origin checking is left ON"
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fi
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echo ""
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echo " ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=${ENV_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN} — ${ORIGIN_WHY}"
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echo ""
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echo " to write:"
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echo " PORT=${ENV_PORT} BROWSER_RELAY_PORT=${ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT}"
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echo " ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=${ENV_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN}"
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echo " POSTGRES_URL=${POSTGRES_URL%%:*}://…"
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echo ""
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echo " the install root is not written here — the platform derives it as the"
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