command hq: the api, mounted and documented

full REST surface for categories, tags and commanders. core permission
(personal: ['/'], no grant to hold — every query is scoped to the caller's
own user_id at the sql layer regardless). registered in the permission
registry and PROTECTED_MOUNTS together, so totality holds by construction.

GET /commanders is the grid endpoint: everything /chat/sessions already
returns per session, plus categoryId/tagIds/running. `running` is derived
live off collectRunningTasks (now exported from websocket.ts) folded over
chat_session_events — not a stored column, on purpose, matching the design
doc's stance that a status field would go stale exactly when a sidecar
restart silently kills a watcher.

GET /commanders/:sessionId deliberately does NOT duplicate the transcript —
that stays GET /chat/sessions/:id, unchanged. a client calls both.

/chat/sessions now excludes anything filed as a commander (listCommandHqSessionIds,
.catch()'d so a hiccup on this feature can't take the whole chat list down)
— the other half of the one predicate this whole design turns on.

there is deliberately no POST /commanders/new: creation is an ordinary chat
turn in the commanders directory, which is the next commit.

docs/command-hq.md gains an API reference table for the mobile dev, and a
status line at the top saying plainly what is real and what is not yet:
needs `bun db:push` before any route returns real data, frontend not
started.

bunx tsgo clean. suite at baseline (same 7 pre-existing failures, all
registry/totality drift and the pty socket test — none touch this router).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/servers/permissions/registry.ts

@@ -266,6 +266,19 @@ const CORE_REGISTRY: Permission[] = [
     routes: ['/dashboards'],
     personal: ['/'],
   },
+  // Core because there is nothing to grant a level of: a commander is the caller's own session, in the
+  // caller's own directory, in a table scoped to the caller's own user_id at every query. Withholding
+  // this from a role would not restrict what they can reach, it would just hide their own conversations
+  // from a second list of the same conversations — the same reasoning `dashboards` above rests on.
+  {
+    key: 'command-hq',
+    label: 'Command HQ',
+    description: 'Long-running commanders you started, organised into categories',
+    kind: 'core',
+    api: ['/command-hq'],
+    routes: ['/command-hq'],
+    personal: ['/'],
+  },
 
   // ── execution: never grantable ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   // Confined since 2026-08-11. A member's shell is spawned by the pty sidecar through `sudo setpriv` as their