offscale is a plugin

headscale leaves the platform. 45 files move to plugins/offscale/ and the
platform stops knowing it exists.

  api/router.ts   the thin auth-gated proxy, now at /api/offscale
  sidecar/        18 files, the whole headscale contract and its admin keys
  db/             schema + queries, offscale_servers
  web/            26 files as panels and a layout — no screen, per the rule

removed from the platform: the hono mount, the `headscale` capability, the
App.tsx route pair, the screen and its barrel, the AppRegistry spread, the
officerdev re-exports, the dock tile, the page-title rule, and both database
barrels. tsgo is clean and nothing references it.

the imports tell the story of what the plugin↔host API actually is. the sidecar
takes @@/sidecar/protocol, @@/sidecar/connect, @@/data-path and
@@/officer-url.mjs; the queries take officerdb/db and officerdb/crypto; the
schema takes officerdb/auth/schema for the one reference a plugin may make; the
web half takes useClient, copyToClipboard, WorkspaceView and TerminalView from
the officerdev barrel. all of it resolves because a plugin lives inside the repo
— no publishing, no version negotiation.

AND IT FOUND A REAL BUG IN THE INSTALLER. createSidecarProxy learns its port
from a one-shot `<name>:server` event and subscribes when the plugin's router is
first imported — at mount. install started the sidecar BEFORE mounting, so the
announcement fired into a void: process online, routes mounted, every request
answering `503 sidecar not available` until something forced a reconnect. it
would have hit every plugin with an http sidecar. `example` never caught it
because it has no listener to announce.

install and enable now mount before starting; disable still unmounts before
stopping. neither direction leaves a mounted route in front of a sidecar that
cannot be reached.

verified live: /api/offscale/_officer/servers answers {"servers":[]}, /offscale
and /offscale/nodes serve, the old /api/headscale is 404, the offscale
capability is registered from the manifest, and officer-offscale is online.

757 pass, same 10 pre-existing failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

plugins/offscale/manifest.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import type { PluginManifest } from '@@/plugins/manifest';
+
+// Offscale — Headscale, plus the Companion that ships beside it.
+//
+// Not a rename of Headscale and not a fork: the server underneath is stock, and the Companion adds what
+// Headscale itself does not do — the invite flow being the first of them. The distinct name marks a
+// distinct product rather than a badge on someone else's.
+//
+// The first real plugin, extracted from the platform on 2026-08-15. Everything it needs is here:
+//
+//   api/router.ts     a thin auth-gated proxy — no Headscale knowledge, and it must never grow any
+//   sidecar/          the whole Headscale contract, holding the admin API keys
+//   db/               offscale_servers, and the only table this plugin owns
+//   web/              panels and a layout; the shell renders the Workspace
+export const manifest: PluginManifest = {
+  publisher: 'officerdev',
+  version: '1.0.0',
+  platform: '>=1.0.0',
+
+  label: 'Offscale',
+  summary: 'Your tailnet — machines, users, pre-auth keys, access policy and device invites',
+  icon: 'Network',
+  color: '#818cf8',
+
+  // One permission gating the whole surface.
+  //
+  // `ownerOnly` because the credential behind it is a Headscale ADMIN api key that can delete every node
+  // on a tailnet, and there is no read-only version of it. A read grant would still be reading through
+  // that key; the protection is that non-owners cannot reach the routes at all.
+  //
+  // Read/write for members is the model recorded in docs/offscale-plugin.md and deliberately not enabled
+  // here yet: it needs the queries to resolve to the OWNER's rows rather than the caller's, which is a
+  // change inside this plugin and not a flag.
+  permissions: [
+    {
+      key: 'offscale',
+      label: 'Offscale',
+      description: 'The tailnet: machines, routes, keys and ACLs',
+      ownerOnly: true,
+      // Two POSTs that are really reads — a reachability probe and a policy DRAFT that never saves.
+      // Without declaring them a read-level account meets a broken feature where a withheld permission
+      // should be. Inert while ownerOnly, and correct the moment that changes.
+      readOnlyWrites: ['/ssh-test', '/policy/assist'],
+    },
+  ],
+};