From b40464632c6aa47e2938a61d09735e004636deb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Padez?= <andre.padez@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 18:13:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] auth: origin-scope the music app to /api/auth + /api/music
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Add MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN to the origin allowlist and a global
originScopeMiddleware that restricts scoped app origins (the standalone
officer-music client) to their permitted path prefixes — /api/auth and
/api/music — and 403s everything else. The main web origin is unaffected,
and the gate no-ops while MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN is unset.

Lets extra sign-in-only users authenticate through the music app and reach
only music + auth, without reintroducing any per-user permission scheme.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts | 41 ++++++++++++++++++-
 src/servers/hono.ts                           |  6 ++-
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts b/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts
index 9640ef6b..c4eda2f7 100644
--- a/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts
+++ b/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
 import * as errors from '../custom-errors';
 import { IS_DEV_BUILD } from '../build-env';
 
-const { PUBLIC_URL, EXPO_PUBLIC_CLIENT_ORIGIN } = process.env;
+const { PUBLIC_URL, EXPO_PUBLIC_CLIENT_ORIGIN, MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN } = process.env;
 
 // The allowed production web origin comes from PUBLIC_URL in .env (e.g. https://officer.pastilhas.dev),
 // not a hardcoded domain.
@@ -28,8 +28,18 @@ const CHROME_EXTENSIONS: string[] = [
 const APP_ORIGINS: string[] = [
   // Expo mobile app — an officer:// custom-scheme origin (with an embedded token), set via env.
   EXPO_PUBLIC_CLIENT_ORIGIN,
+  // Standalone officer-music app — its own custom-scheme origin. Allowlisted so it can authenticate
+  // and stream; SCOPED_ORIGINS below restricts it to /api/auth + /api/music only.
+  MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN,
 ].filter((o): o is string => Boolean(o));
 
+// Origins restricted to a subset of the API. A request whose Origin is a key here may reach ONLY the
+// listed path prefixes; anything else is 403 (enforced by originScopeMiddleware, mounted globally in
+// hono.ts). Origins not listed here (the main web origin) keep full access. No-ops while the env is
+// unset, so it's safe to ship before the app side is configured.
+const SCOPED_ORIGINS: Record<string, string[]> = {};
+if (MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN) SCOPED_ORIGINS[MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN] = ['/api/auth', '/api/music'];
+
 export function isOriginAllowed(origin: string | undefined, host?: string): boolean {
   if (IS_DEV_BUILD) return true;
 
@@ -60,3 +70,32 @@ export const originValidationMiddleware: MiddlewareHandler = function (ctx, next
   }
   return next();
 };
+
+function resolveOrigin(headerOrigin: string | undefined, referer: string | undefined): string | undefined {
+  if (headerOrigin) return headerOrigin;
+  if (referer) {
+    try {
+      return new URL(referer).origin;
+    } catch {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+// Global gate: a scoped app origin (e.g. the standalone music app) may only reach its allowed path
+// prefixes; every other path is 403. Reads the Origin header directly (not ctx 'origin') so it applies
+// across the whole /api tree — including the public /api/auth and the protected /api/music — regardless
+// of which routers mount originMiddleware. Requests from unscoped origins pass straight through.
+export const originScopeMiddleware: MiddlewareHandler = function (ctx, next) {
+  const origin = resolveOrigin(ctx.req.header('origin'), ctx.req.header('referer'));
+  if (origin) {
+    const allowed = SCOPED_ORIGINS[origin];
+    if (allowed) {
+      const path = ctx.req.path;
+      const permitted = allowed.some((prefix) => path === prefix || path.startsWith(`${prefix}/`));
+      if (!permitted) throw errors.FORBIDDEN('Origin not permitted for this resource');
+    }
+  }
+  return next();
+};
diff --git a/src/servers/hono.ts b/src/servers/hono.ts
index 16ac3b57..70a2c8b5 100644
--- a/src/servers/hono.ts
+++ b/src/servers/hono.ts
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ import { chatRouter } from './api/chat/chat';
 import { pipelineJobsRouter } from './api/tasks/pipeline-jobs-routes';
 import { broadcastPanelRefresh } from './api/terminal/websocket';
 import { CustomError } from './custom-errors';
-import { userMiddleware, bodyParser, isOriginAllowed } from './_middlewares';
+import { userMiddleware, bodyParser, isOriginAllowed, originScopeMiddleware } from './_middlewares';
 
 export { Hono };
 export { createRouter };
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ honoServer.use(
   }),
 );
 
+// Scoped-origin gate: restrict app origins (e.g. the music app) to their allowed path prefixes
+// (/api/auth + /api/music). No-ops for the main web origin and while MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN is unset.
+honoServer.use(originScopeMiddleware);
+
 honoServer.get('/api', (ctx) => ctx.json({ officerAPI: 'ok' }));
 honoServer.route('/api/auth', authRouter);
 honoServer.route('/api/landing-page-data', landingPageDataRouter);