close three cross-account holes found reading the multi-user path

reset-password accepted any valid signed jwt as a reset token, including a
30-day session token — its sibling verify-token.ts already gated on
purpose === 'reset-password' and this handler did not. forgot-password mints
that claim, so the gate costs the legitimate flow nothing.

notify's DELETE /_officer/devices/:token deleted by token with no user
predicate: a token is the address of a device, not a secret, so any account
holding the notify capability could deregister another's device.
deletePushDevice now takes an optional userId — the route passes it, the
APNs/FCM dead-token paths deliberately do not.

POST /_officer/notify let a request body's userId override the
proxy-injected X-Officer-User. The header now wins where present, which is
what separates a signed-in browser from a loopback producer that has no
session to speak from.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-07 21:58:36 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 7ce9289921
commit ac64a7362b
4 changed files with 39 additions and 12 deletions
+15 -3
View File
@@ -37,9 +37,21 @@ export async function getPushDevices(userId: number, appSlug?: string): Promise<
return db.select().from(pushDevices).where(where);
}
/** Sign-out, or a hard rejection from Apple/Google (410 Unregistered, UNREGISTERED). */
export async function deletePushDevice(token: string): Promise<void> {
await db.delete(pushDevices).where(eq(pushDevices.token, token));
/**
* Sign-out, or a hard rejection from Apple/Google (410 Unregistered, UNREGISTERED).
*
* `userId` is optional because the two callers are genuinely different. The APNs/FCM paths delete a
* token the provider has just declared dead, which is true for whoever owns it — they pass nothing. The
* `DELETE /_officer/devices/:token` route is reached by a signed-in account naming a token in the URL,
* so it MUST pass its own id: a token is the address of a device, not a secret, and without the
* predicate any account could deregister another's device by guessing or replaying one.
*/
export async function deletePushDevice(token: string, userId?: number): Promise<void> {
const where =
userId === undefined
? eq(pushDevices.token, token)
: and(eq(pushDevices.token, token), eq(pushDevices.userId, userId));
await db.delete(pushDevices).where(where);
}
/**