user provisioning: the platform pushes the account list to plugins that declare it

a plugin that creates accounts in an upstream service — jellyfin first, immich
next — needs to know who the platform's users are. it now gets told.

DECLARED IN THE MANIFEST, not asserted at registration. `name` and `handles`
arrive on an unauthenticated socket and are believed, so a capability claimed
there would be a plugin granting itself one. the manifest was reviewed when the
owner installed it, and sits beside `permissions` where "this plugin will be
told who your users are" belongs — on the install screen, not discovered later.

PUSHED, not requested. a sidecar has no authenticated way to ask, so a request
could only be answered, never authorised. a push inverts that: the platform
decides who gets it, and a caller registering under a name with no such
manifest gets nothing.

`listProvisionableUsers` is a hand-written projection — id, email, username,
name, role — and NOT `select *`. `users` holds `password` and `os_user`, and
`getUsers()` returns both, so a plugin reaching for the obvious function would
get every account's password hash. naming the columns means adding a secret to
the table cannot silently add it to what plugins receive. pinned by a test that
asserts the key set, not just the absence of today's secrets.

the owner is excluded. they bypass every permission check and already have
whatever upstream account they want; provisioning them is at best a no-op and
at worst a second admin nobody asked for.

sent after the ack rather than inside it, so registration never waits on a
database query — a slow postgres would otherwise stall every sidecar's startup,
and none of them need the list to start.

and re-sent on every account create and delete, because the registration copy
is a snapshot: a plugin still holding a deleted user would keep an upstream
login alive for someone the platform has removed. read once per broadcast, so
two plugins cannot be told different things about the same moment.

src/servers/plugins/user-provisioning.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
+import { listProvisionableUsers, getUsers, OWNER_USER_ID } from 'officerdb';
+
+describe('what a plugin is told about users', () => {
+  // The whole point of the projection. `users` holds `password` (the hash) and `os_user`, and `getUsers()`
+  // is `select *` — so a plugin reaching for the obvious function gets every account's password hash.
+  // This asserts the narrow one cannot, no matter what is added to the table later.
+  test('never carries a password hash or an os user', async () => {
+    const rows = await listProvisionableUsers();
+    if (!rows.length) return; // a server with only an owner is a legitimate state
+
+    const keys = Object.keys(rows[0]!).sort();
+    expect(keys).toEqual(['email', 'id', 'name', 'role', 'username']);
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('password');
+      expect(row).not.toHaveProperty('osUser');
+    }
+  });
+
+  // The owner bypasses every permission check and already has whatever upstream account they want.
+  // Provisioning them is at best a no-op and at worst a second admin nobody asked for.
+  test('excludes the owner', async () => {
+    const rows = await listProvisionableUsers();
+    expect(rows.some((r) => r.id === OWNER_USER_ID)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('includes everyone else', async () => {
+    const all = await getUsers();
+    const provisionable = await listProvisionableUsers();
+    expect(provisionable.length).toBe(all.filter((u) => u.id !== OWNER_USER_ID).length);
+  });
+});