user provisioning: the platform pushes the account list to plugins that declare it
a plugin that creates accounts in an upstream service — jellyfin first, immich next — needs to know who the platform's users are. it now gets told. DECLARED IN THE MANIFEST, not asserted at registration. `name` and `handles` arrive on an unauthenticated socket and are believed, so a capability claimed there would be a plugin granting itself one. the manifest was reviewed when the owner installed it, and sits beside `permissions` where "this plugin will be told who your users are" belongs — on the install screen, not discovered later. PUSHED, not requested. a sidecar has no authenticated way to ask, so a request could only be answered, never authorised. a push inverts that: the platform decides who gets it, and a caller registering under a name with no such manifest gets nothing. `listProvisionableUsers` is a hand-written projection — id, email, username, name, role — and NOT `select *`. `users` holds `password` and `os_user`, and `getUsers()` returns both, so a plugin reaching for the obvious function would get every account's password hash. naming the columns means adding a secret to the table cannot silently add it to what plugins receive. pinned by a test that asserts the key set, not just the absence of today's secrets. the owner is excluded. they bypass every permission check and already have whatever upstream account they want; provisioning them is at best a no-op and at worst a second admin nobody asked for. sent after the ack rather than inside it, so registration never waits on a database query — a slow postgres would otherwise stall every sidecar's startup, and none of them need the list to start. and re-sent on every account create and delete, because the registration copy is a snapshot: a plugin still holding a deleted user would keep an upstream login alive for someone the platform has removed. read once per broadcast, so two plugins cannot be told different things about the same moment.
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@@ -263,6 +263,21 @@ export type PluginManifest = {
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* See `npm-deps.ts`.
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*/
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npmDependencies?: Record<string, string>;
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/**
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* This plugin creates accounts in its upstream service, one per Officer account.
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*
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* Declared HERE rather than asserted at registration, so it is reviewed when the owner installs the
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* plugin and shown beside the permissions — "this plugin will be told who your users are" is exactly
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* the sort of thing a person wants on the install screen rather than discovered afterwards.
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*
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* What it buys the plugin: on registering, its sidecar is sent the account list — id, email, username,
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* name, role, owner excluded. See `listProvisionableUsers`, which is a hand-written projection so a
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* password hash cannot reach a plugin by accident.
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*
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* See plugins/USER_PROVISIONING.md for what a plugin is then expected to do with it.
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*/
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userProvisioning?: boolean;
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};
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/** What the platform knows about a plugin on disk: its manifest, plus everything the tree said. */
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