27 tests on the file standing between a member and a shell
authorize.ts had none, and its own header is what says why that mattered: every deny path in the platform ends there, and the failure mode of a permissive default is not a bug report, it is someone else's session. It had none for a structural reason rather than an oversight. Every path needed two database calls, and the only file here that mocks officerdb leaks its stub into whatever runs after it — so the obvious approach would have traded one untested file for a flaky suite. So the decisions are split from the fetching. resolveEffectivePermissions, decideApiRequest and decideWsProvider are pure functions of their arguments; the async wrappers keep the role cache, the fail-closed catches and the shape callers use. No behaviour change, and the live gate still answers 401 on file-browser, users and tasks. REAL registry keys throughout, deliberately: a suite built on invented permissions keeps passing after a rename, which is the failure an authorization table can least afford. If a key here disappears this file goes red. Pinned beyond the happy paths — the owner carries no grants to consult; core is write unconditionally; a confined grant is dropped without a Linux user and all three drop together; execution and admin grants in the table are ignored even though no CHECK stops the row existing; an unknown key is ignored without disturbing what is legitimately held; self-service is exact in method AND path; a socket needs no level; an unauthenticated caller is refused every door. Two gaps are stated in the file rather than left to be found: ownerOnly has no declaring permission yet, so testing it would test the fixtures; and the grant cache's contract is a claim about call sites, not logic. Found while writing them: readOnlyWrites paths are relative to the permission's api prefix, and getting that wrong fails as "no permission covers this path" rather than as a level error — a misleading message for a misleading path, now commented at the test that hit it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ the owner's OS user and can never be granted. Indirection there really is accide
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## Themes
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**85 open, 24 closed**, across 29 themes.
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**84 open, 25 closed**, across 29 themes.
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| Theme | Open | Closed |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ the owner's OS user and can never be granted. Indirection there really is accide
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| [Infra (alpha)](todo/infra/) | 6 | 0 |
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| [Known bugs](todo/known-bugs/) | 3 | 2 |
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| [Mobile apps](todo/mobile-apps/) | 3 | 0 |
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| [Multi-user](todo/multi-user/) | 17 | 4 |
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| [Multi-user](todo/multi-user/) | 16 | 5 |
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| [Notifications](todo/notifications/) | 1 | 0 |
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| [Plugin ecosystem — before it opens to third parties (2026-08-18)](todo/plugin-ecosystem/) | 3 | 0 |
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| [Plugin infrastructure](todo/plugin-infrastructure/) | 2 | 0 |
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