build the secret store: one key per purpose, none in .env

.env now holds PORT and POSTGRES_URL. Every encryption and signing key lives in
$OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db — 0600, 0700 directory, owned by the
service user, created on first use.

The design doc planned to move ONE at-rest key into the store. What shipped
splits it: headscale, wallet, photos, jellyfin, invoiceshelf, vault and
service-connections each get their own, plus jwt. VAULT_STORE_KEY encrypted all
seven, so one leak opened all of them — and it was named after whichever plugin
needed it first, which is why it read as safe to change if you did not run a
vault. A core install bootstraps two, jwt and headscale; the rest appear when
their plugin first asks.

The file IS the secret. No second key unlocks it, because a key beside the store
it opens buys nothing. The gain was never secrecy, it is blast radius: bun
auto-loads .env into all twenty pm2 processes, so a key there is readable from
/proc/<pid>/environ of twenty processes — officer-music held the key that
decrypts wallet seed envelopes.

Two defects found by testing the store rather than reading it, both of which
would have shipped:

  The WAL was 0644. Enabling WAL creates -wal and -shm at 0644 rather than
  inheriting the database's mode, and a freshly written key lives in the WAL
  before checkpoint — so the 0600 on the database was decorative. The 0700
  directory covered it, but only until someone loosened the directory.

  PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL takes an exclusive lock, and busy_timeout was set
  AFTER it. With twelve concurrent openers, six died on that line with
  SQLITE_BUSY. Every sidecar opens this store at boot, so they open it
  simultaneously by definition: most of them would have failed to start on a cold
  boot and none on a warm one. Fixed by ordering the pragmas; re-tested with
  twelve racing processes, one key, one row.

crypto.ts takes a purpose as its first argument now, which the design doc had
explicitly promised would not happen — 32 call sites across seven query modules.
That promise is corrected in the doc rather than quietly dropped.

Also live, not just comments: wallet/upstream.ts gated wallet storage on
process.env.VAULT_STORE_KEY and would have reported "unconfigured" forever. It
asks the store now, and the question it answers changed — not "did somebody set a
variable" but "can this process open the store", since the key is created on
demand.

assertSecretsClosed covers the store, its directory and its WAL. The jwt key
mints owner tokens, so a member's shell reading it is strictly worse than the
.env leak that check was written for.

Not typechecked: node_modules is empty and installs are frozen, so the
officerdb/secret-store subpath could not be resolved at runtime here — verified
that officerdb/types fails identically, so it is the empty tree and not the new
export. The store module itself was tested directly: creation, idempotence across
processes, hasKey not creating, permissions, and the twelve-way race. Every
changed file parses; the setup section runs and degrades correctly when the
import is unavailable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/servers/api/browser/relay-auth.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
 import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
+import { getKey } from 'officerdb/secret-store';
 
 const RELAY_TOKEN_CONTEXT = 'officer-browser-relay-v1';
 
-const { JWT_SECRET } = process.env;
-
-if (!JWT_SECRET) {
-  throw new Error('JWT_SECRET is required for browser relay auth');
-}
+// Nothing imports this file today — the browser relay is switched off pending extraction into a plugin
+// (see server.tsx). Updated with everything else so it is coherent when it comes back: it read
+// JWT_SECRET from the environment, which no longer exists, and would have thrown at module load.
+//
+// When it is extracted it should take its own purpose rather than borrowing 'jwt' — a plugin deriving
+// tokens from the platform's signing key is the coupling the per-purpose split exists to remove.
 
 export function deriveRelayToken(userId: number, port: number, salt: string): string {
-  return createHmac('sha256', JWT_SECRET!)
+  return createHmac('sha256', getKey('jwt'))
     .update(`${RELAY_TOKEN_CONTEXT}:${port}:${userId}:${salt}`)
     .digest('hex');
 }