notify: only "the app is gone" deletes a device row

reported from the field on the first real push: it failed with BadDeviceToken
and the server deleted the registration. the build was production-signed and
the row said sandbox — a configuration mismatch, with the device and the app
both perfectly fine.

pruning there destroys the evidence. the phone re-registers on next launch,
the row comes back looking healthy, and the next send fails identically; you
can lose a day to that loop without ever seeing what is actually wrong.

so the one set becomes three. Unregistered/UNREGISTERED/NOT_FOUND prune —
apple and google are saying the app is uninstalled. BadDeviceToken,
DeviceTokenNotForTopic, TopicDisallowed, INVALID_ARGUMENT and
SENDER_ID_MISMATCH are OURS: the row is kept and the log says what to check.
everything else is transient and still counts toward three strikes.

INVALID_ARGUMENT was the sharpest one. it is how fcm reports a malformed
MESSAGE — including a non-string in `data`, which is the mistake this codebase
is most likely to make and already has a test for. deleting on it meant one
bug in the payload builder would wipe every android device from the registry
on a single send, presenting as "android push stopped working" with nothing
left to explain why.

misconfigured is also not counted as a strike. not deleting is not enough on
its own — a persistent mismatch would reach three failures and delete the row
anyway, which is the same bug with a slower fuse.

the apns log now names the mismatch rather than the reason code, since the
code alone sends people to look at the device: it prints the row's environment
and topic and says to check the SHIPPED artefact rather than the intermediate
build, which is exactly where this one hid.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-19 21:25:20 +00:00
parent c6ef0b34db
commit 5cba1b65a6
19 changed files with 391 additions and 34 deletions
+5 -2
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { isWsProviderAllowed } from './servers/permissions/authorize';
import { isTokenBlacklisted, getUserById } from 'officerdb';
import { terminalWebsocket } from './servers/api/terminal/websocket';
import { chatWebsocket } from './servers/api/chat/websocket';
import { chatNotifyWebsocket } from './servers/api/chat/notify-delivery';
import { taskRunnerWebsocket } from './servers/api/tasks/task-executor';
import { pipelineWebsocket } from './servers/api/tasks/pipeline-executor';
// import { desktopWebsocket } from './servers/api/desktop/websocket';
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ type WSData = {
userId: number;
email: string;
username: string;
provider: 'terminal' | 'chat' | 'task-runner' | 'pipeline' | 'desktop' | 'sidecar';
provider: 'terminal' | 'chat' | 'chat-notify' | 'task-runner' | 'pipeline' | 'desktop' | 'sidecar';
sessionId?: string;
cwd?: string;
command?: string;
@@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ const handlers: Record<string, any> = {
terminal: terminalWebsocket,
'dev-proxy': devProxyWebsocket,
chat: chatWebsocket,
'chat-notify': chatNotifyWebsocket,
'task-runner': taskRunnerWebsocket,
pipeline: pipelineWebsocket,
// desktop: desktopWebsocket,
@@ -292,7 +294,7 @@ console.log(
async function upgradeWs(
req: Request,
server: any,
provider: 'terminal' | 'chat' | 'task-runner' | 'pipeline' | 'desktop',
provider: 'terminal' | 'chat' | 'chat-notify' | 'task-runner' | 'pipeline' | 'desktop',
) {
const token = new URL(req.url).searchParams.get('token');
if (!token) return new Response('Unauthorized', { status: 401 });
@@ -422,6 +424,7 @@ const server = serve({
'/api/tasks/pipeline/ws': (req, server) => upgradeWs(req, server, 'pipeline'),
'/api/terminal/ws': (req, server) => upgradeWs(req, server, 'terminal'),
'/api/chat/ws': (req, server) => upgradeWs(req, server, 'chat'),
'/api/chat/notify/ws': (req, server) => upgradeWs(req, server, 'chat-notify'),
// '/api/desktop/ws': (req, server) => upgradeWs(req, server, 'desktop'),
// CalDAV/CardDAV. These live OUTSIDE /api because DAV clients are given a bare domain and probe
// fixed, spec-defined paths — `/.well-known/caldav` unauthenticated, before they hold any