diff --git a/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts b/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts
index 83a60166..898df015 100644
--- a/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts
+++ b/src/servers/_middlewares/origin-validation.ts
@@ -85,18 +85,29 @@ for (const { slug, origin } of APP_ORIGIN_LIST) {
 // Last, so the web origin wins if an app ever declares the same one.
 if (PUBLIC_ORIGIN) ORIGIN_RULES[PUBLIC_ORIGIN] = { superAdminOnly: true };
 
-// ── TEMPORARY: origin exemption for /api/music ──
-// Off unless ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC=true. While the platform is still internet-exposed, this lets a music
-// client that cannot present the app's custom-scheme origin reach /api/music anyway. It drops ONE layer:
-// a valid token is still required (userMiddleware) and the non-owner account backstop still confines
-// music accounts. Origin was never authentication — it is client-chosen and trivially forged outside a
-// browser — so this removes defence in depth, not the lock. Delete once the tailnet is the perimeter.
+// ── TEMPORARY: origin checking switched off ──
+// ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=true accepts every Origin, everywhere, and skips the per-origin path scoping.
+// ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC=true is the narrower version, /api/music only — which is not enough on its own,
+// because an app has to reach /api/auth to sign in before it ever calls its own feature.
+//
+// What still holds with these on: every protected route requires a valid token (userMiddleware), and the
+// account backstop below still confines a non-owner account to /api/auth + /api/music whatever Origin it
+// claims — that one is deliberately NOT disabled, since it is account-based, not origin-based.
+//
+// What is lost: defence in depth, not the lock. Origin was never authentication here — `officer://<hex>`
+// is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from a shipped app binary.
+// Both flags and their call sites come out once the tailnet is the perimeter.
+const ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN = process.env.ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN === 'true';
 const ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC = process.env.ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC === 'true';
 
-export function isMusicOriginExempt(path: string): boolean {
-  return ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC && pathAllowed(path, ['/api/music']);
+export function isOriginCheckDisabled(path?: string): boolean {
+  if (ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN) return true;
+  return ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC && !!path && pathAllowed(path, ['/api/music']);
 }
 
+/** @deprecated use isOriginCheckDisabled — kept so existing call sites read the same. */
+export const isMusicOriginExempt = isOriginCheckDisabled;
+
 // True when an Origin is reserved for the platform owner (used at signin to reject a non-owner login).
 export function isSuperAdminOnlyOrigin(origin: string | undefined): boolean {
   return !!origin && ORIGIN_RULES[origin]?.superAdminOnly === true;
@@ -104,6 +115,7 @@ export function isSuperAdminOnlyOrigin(origin: string | undefined): boolean {
 
 export function isOriginAllowed(origin: string | undefined, host?: string): boolean {
   if (IS_DEV_BUILD) return true;
+  if (ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN) return true;
 
   if (origin) {
     if (origin.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) {
@@ -178,7 +190,10 @@ export const originScopeMiddleware: MiddlewareHandler = async function (ctx, nex
     throw errors.FORBIDDEN('This account is limited to the music app');
   }
 
-  // 2. Per-origin rules.
+  // 2. Per-origin rules. Skipped entirely while origin checking is off (the account backstop above is
+  // account-based, not origin-based, so it deliberately still applies).
+  if (isOriginCheckDisabled(path)) return next();
+
   const rule = origin ? ORIGIN_RULES[origin] : undefined;
   if (rule) {
     if (rule.paths && !pathAllowed(path, rule.paths)) {