diff --git a/src/databases/officer_db/src/crypto.ts b/src/databases/officer_db/src/crypto.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..71fcfd2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/databases/officer_db/src/crypto.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+
+// AES-256-GCM at-rest encryption for vault secrets (the brokered Vaultwarden token set + the Officer-app
+// protector key). The whole point of the vault store is that a DB dump must not hand over the keys to the
+// vault, so these columns are never stored plaintext.
+//
+// Key = SHA-256(VAULT_STORE_KEY) so any sufficiently strong secret works (mirrors the JWT_SECRET style).
+// Format = base64(iv[12] | authTag[16] | ciphertext). The key is read LAZILY so the platform still boots
+// without a vault configured — vault storage ops then throw a clear error instead of crashing startup.
+
+let cachedKey: Buffer | null = null;
+function key(): Buffer {
+  if (cachedKey) return cachedKey;
+  const secret = process.env.VAULT_STORE_KEY;
+  if (!secret || secret.length < 16) {
+    throw new Error('VAULT_STORE_KEY must be set (>=16 chars) to store vault secrets');
+  }
+  cachedKey = createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
+  return cachedKey;
+}
+
+/** Encrypt a UTF-8 secret for at-rest storage → base64(iv|tag|ciphertext). */
+export function encryptSecret(plaintext: string): string {
+  const iv = randomBytes(12);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key(), iv);
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return Buffer.concat([iv, tag, ct]).toString('base64');
+}
+
+/** Decrypt a value produced by encryptSecret. Throws if the ciphertext/tag/key don't verify. */
+export function decryptSecret(blob: string): string {
+  const buf = Buffer.from(blob, 'base64');
+  const iv = buf.subarray(0, 12);
+  const tag = buf.subarray(12, 28);
+  const ct = buf.subarray(28);
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key(), iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+  return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
+}
diff --git a/src/databases/officer_db/src/index.ts b/src/databases/officer_db/src/index.ts
index 1e3b8e97..61e32c84 100644
--- a/src/databases/officer_db/src/index.ts
+++ b/src/databases/officer_db/src/index.ts
@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ export type {
   PlaylistSummary,
   Playlist,
 } from './queries/music';
+export {
+  getVaultTokens,
+  setVaultTokens,
+  clearVaultTokens,
+  getVaultUnlockKey,
+  setVaultUnlockKey,
+  clearVaultUnlockKey,
+} from './queries/vault';
+export type { VaultTokenSet } from './queries/vault';
 
 export { db } from './db';
 export * as schema from './schema';
diff --git a/src/databases/officer_db/src/queries/vault.ts b/src/databases/officer_db/src/queries/vault.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4c54681c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/databases/officer_db/src/queries/vault.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db';
+import { vaultTokens, vaultUnlockKeys } from '../schema';
+import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
+
+// Vault store access. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — encryption to/from at-rest ciphertext happens here, so
+// the token broker / proxy never touch the crypto directly. See ../crypto.ts and ../schema/vault.ts.
+
+export type VaultTokenSet = {
+  accessToken: string;
+  refreshToken: string;
+  expiresAt: Date | null;
+  deviceIdentifier: string | null;
+};
+
+/** The owner's brokered Vaultwarden token set (decrypted), or null if none is stored. */
+export async function getVaultTokens(userId: number): Promise<VaultTokenSet | null> {
+  const [row] = await db.select().from(vaultTokens).where(eq(vaultTokens.userId, userId));
+  if (!row) return null;
+  return {
+    accessToken: decryptSecret(row.accessToken),
+    refreshToken: decryptSecret(row.refreshToken),
+    expiresAt: row.expiresAt,
+    deviceIdentifier: row.deviceIdentifier,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Upsert the owner's token set (one row per account). Secrets are encrypted before write. */
+export async function setVaultTokens(userId: number, t: VaultTokenSet): Promise<void> {
+  const values = {
+    userId,
+    accessToken: encryptSecret(t.accessToken),
+    refreshToken: encryptSecret(t.refreshToken),
+    expiresAt: t.expiresAt,
+    deviceIdentifier: t.deviceIdentifier,
+    updatedAt: new Date(),
+  };
+  await db
+    .insert(vaultTokens)
+    .values(values)
+    .onConflictDoUpdate({
+      target: vaultTokens.userId,
+      set: {
+        accessToken: values.accessToken,
+        refreshToken: values.refreshToken,
+        expiresAt: values.expiresAt,
+        deviceIdentifier: values.deviceIdentifier,
+        updatedAt: values.updatedAt,
+      },
+    });
+}
+
+/** Drop the token set (platform logout / distress / panic). */
+export async function clearVaultTokens(userId: number): Promise<void> {
+  await db.delete(vaultTokens).where(eq(vaultTokens.userId, userId));
+}
+
+/** The owner's stored protector key (decrypted), or null. Officer-app unlock path only. */
+export async function getVaultUnlockKey(userId: number): Promise<string | null> {
+  const [row] = await db.select().from(vaultUnlockKeys).where(eq(vaultUnlockKeys.userId, userId));
+  return row ? decryptSecret(row.wrappedKey) : null;
+}
+
+/** Store/replace the protector key (encrypted). Set once at setup; persists across normal logout. */
+export async function setVaultUnlockKey(userId: number, wrappedKey: string): Promise<void> {
+  const values = { userId, wrappedKey: encryptSecret(wrappedKey), updatedAt: new Date() };
+  await db
+    .insert(vaultUnlockKeys)
+    .values(values)
+    .onConflictDoUpdate({
+      target: vaultUnlockKeys.userId,
+      set: { wrappedKey: values.wrappedKey, updatedAt: values.updatedAt },
+    });
+}
+
+/** Wipe the protector key (distress / panic → forces a one-time master-password re-setup). */
+export async function clearVaultUnlockKey(userId: number): Promise<void> {
+  await db.delete(vaultUnlockKeys).where(eq(vaultUnlockKeys.userId, userId));
+}
diff --git a/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/index.ts b/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/index.ts
index 640b86ca..8950d94d 100644
--- a/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/index.ts
+++ b/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/index.ts
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ export * from './email';
 export * from './pipeline-jobs';
 export * from './chat-events';
 export * from './music';
+export * from './vault';
diff --git a/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/vault.ts b/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/vault.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5bfe9a13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/vault.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import { pgTable, integer, text, timestamp } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
+import { users } from './auth';
+
+// Officer Vault server-side state (see VAULT_AUTH_SPEC.md). The device never holds a Vaultwarden token;
+// the platform brokers it, stores it here tied to the owner account, and injects it on proxied /api/vault
+// requests. All secret columns are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest (see ../crypto.ts).
+
+// The brokered Vaultwarden token set. One row per owner account (single active vault session). Dropped on
+// platform logout / distress / panic.
+export const vaultTokens = pgTable('vault_tokens', {
+  userId: integer('user_id')
+    .primaryKey()
+    .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+  accessToken: text('access_token').notNull(), // encrypted
+  refreshToken: text('refresh_token').notNull(), // encrypted
+  expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }),
+  deviceIdentifier: text('device_identifier'), // plaintext; the last device that brokered a login
+  updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+});
+
+// The platform-held "protector key" for the Officer-app unlock path: it unwraps the on-device wrapped user
+// key, so a valid platform session opens the vault without the master password. Persists across normal
+// logout (frictionless re-login); wiped on distress/panic (forces a one-time master-password re-setup).
+// The zero-knowledge OffVault path never writes here (its protector stays in the Secure Enclave).
+export const vaultUnlockKeys = pgTable('vault_unlock_keys', {
+  userId: integer('user_id')
+    .primaryKey()
+    .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+  wrappedKey: text('wrapped_key').notNull(), // encrypted (the protector key)
+  updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+});